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WARRANTY LITIGATION
One of the major changes in law in the last twenty years has
been the explosive development of the law of products liability.'
While products liability deals generally with recovery of damages
caused by products, it can in fact be subdivided into three areas:
personal injury and property damage, commercial economic loss
and consumer economic loss. The most dramatic types of prod-
ucts liability cases involve personal injury, especially death, or
property damage.2 Courts have developed novel theories of liabil-
ity, such as strict liability in tort, to protect individuals who
suffer personal harm or property damage from products.3 Injury
from a product, however, may involve economic loss rather than
personal injury.4 For example, the farmer who loses the profit
from a crop because he purchased defective seed and the con-
sumer who buys an automobile with a defective transmission
have both suffered economic loss. As the examples show,
economic-loss cases can be classified as either commercial or con-
sumer. While such a division was less important a few years ago,
it has become very significant with the passage of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, which regulates consumer product warran-
ties.
This article is limited to the third division of the field of
products liability: cases that involve economic loss suffered by
consumers. The article does not include a complete discussion of
strict liability in tort because that theory applies primarily to
recovery of damages for personal injuries and property damage.
However, strict liability theory is discussed to the extent it ap-
plies to economic loss suffered by consumers. While the article is
limited to economic loss in consumer cases, some of the discus-
1. For a discussion of the history of the development of products liability see Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. RPv. 791 (1966).
2. Property damage means damage that results from a sudden occurrence, for exam-
ple, the damage that results when an automobile strikes a wall because of a defective tire.
Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977). In Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270
S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the term
"property" within the meaning of S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976) included lost profits,
a form of economic loss.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 402A (1965). South Carolina has adopted strict
liability in tort by statute. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).
4. Economic loss may be divided into direct economic loss (sometimes called "loss
of bargain") and indirect economic loss. Loss of bargain means the difference between the
value of the product with a defect and the value it would have had if it had been defect-
free. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-714(2) (1976). Indirect economic loss means incidental and
consequential damage resulting from a defective product, such as towing expenses or lost
wages. See id. § 36-2-715(1),(2).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
1980]
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sion, such as the material on disclaimers of warranties, has relev-
ance in commercial cases.
The article is divided into five parts. Part I discusses creation
of warranties. Part II deals with breach of warranties. Part III
examines remedies for breach; defenses to warranty claims are
discussed in Part IV. Other theories of liability are the focus of
Part V.
I. CREATION OF WARRANTIES
Traditionally, warranties have been divided into four catego-
ries: express warranties, implied warranties of merchantability,
implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and warran-
ties of title.' Because of the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act,
7
this classification is no longer appropriate for consumer products.
Instead, warranties on consumer products should be classified
into two categories: written warranties and other warranties.
Written warranties may be classified as either "full" or
"limited. " 8 A single consumer product may have full written war-
ranties that apply to some parts and limited written warranties
on others. Other warranties may be subdivided into the tradi-
tional classifications. Although both types of warranties are af-
fected by the Magnuson-Moss Act, written warranties are con-
trolled to a much greater extent.
Sellers of consumer products may provide maintenance or
repair services through service contracts rather than by warranty.
The Magnuson-Moss Act recognizes the existence of service con-
tracts. 10 For litigation purposes, service contracts are treated
much like limited warranties."
A. Written Warranties on Consumer Products
1. Scope of the Magnuson-Moss Act. - Written warranties
on consumer products are subject to the provisions of the
Magnuson-Moss Act." For an attorney involved in consumer-
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-313 (1976) (express warranties), 36-2-314 (implied war-
ranty of merchantability), 36-2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
The Code also contains a warranty of title. Id. § 36-2-312.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
8. Id. § 2303(a).
9. Id. § 2305.
10. Id. § 2301(8).
11. Id. §§ 2306 (disclosure), 2308(a)(2) (disclaimers of implied warranties), 2310(d)
(remedies).
12. Id. §§ 2301-2312.
[Vol. 31
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WARRANTY LITIGATION
product warranty litigation, understanding the concept of a writ-
ten warranty is important.
The Act defines a written warranty to mean:
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by
a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that
such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a
specified level of performance over a specified period of
time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the
sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair,
replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such
product in the event that such product fails to meet the
specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes
part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer
for purposes other than resale of such product.
1 3
As normally written, the typical written warranty is an amal-
gam of traditional warranty provisions having three parts: (1) a
narrowly drawn express warranty; (2) a limitation on implied
warranties; and (3) a clause that modifies remedies in the event
of breach. The automobile warranty included in the appendix is
illustrative.
To be a written warranty the warranty must be in connection
with the sale of a consumer product, which is defined as: "any
tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for personal, family, or household pur-
poses (including any such property intended to be attached to or
installed in any real property without regard to whether it is so
attached or installed)." 4 Local transactions are covered because
the Act applies to any product that is "distributed in commerce,"
which is defined as trade between states or trade that affects
business between states." The regulations promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission under the Act state that a product
will be deemed to be a consumer product if its use for personal,
family or household purposes is not uncommon.'6 Automobiles
13. Id. § 2301(6).
14. Id. § 2301(1).
15. Id. § 2301(13),(14).
16. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (1979).
1980]
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and typewriters, which may be used for either consumer or com-
mercial purposes, are thus subject to the Act.' 7 The regulations
contain provisions on the treatment of building materials and
fixtures."5 Fixtures are subject to the Act, while building materi-
als are covered if sold separately, rather than as part of a finished
building.'9 The Act does not apply to warranties in connection
with the rendering of services, but if goods are sold in connection
with services, all warranties must comply with the Act."0 Thus, if
an automobile repair shop warrants parts and labor, the warranty
must comply with the Act, but not if only the labor is covered.
The Act generally applies to manufacturers of consumer
products rather than suppliers of component parts or dealers.
Suppliers of component parts usually are not covered because
they usually do not sell consumer products within the meaning
of the Act.2' Dealers are not subject to the Act because the Act
states that a written warranty may only be enforced against the
person actually making the warranty. 2 The regulations, however,
state that the Act may apply to a dealer who adopts a manufac-
turer's warranty.? Of course, a dealer might make a written war-
ranty of its own in addition to the manufacturer's warranty and
such a warranty would be subject to the Act.
A written warranty under the Act must meet certain require-
ments. Most, but not all, express warranties that are in writing
17. Id. The regulation implies that a product often sold for consumer purposes is still
subject to the Act when sold for commercial purposes, for example, a sale of 10 automo-
biles to a business. This conclusion comes from a reading of the final regulation on
disclosure of warranty terms which state that "products which are purchased solely for
commercial or industrial use are excluded solely for purposes of this Part" thus implying
that the other provisions of the Act apply. Id. § 701.1(b). But see Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act: Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721 (1975) (last
sentence of section on products covered states: "However, nothing in the Act prohibits a
limitation or elimination of coverage where the product is put to commercial, rental, or
other use not described in section 101(1)." Application of the Act to commercial transac-
tions could lead to inefficiency because it limits the ability of commercial entities to
control risk through contract. For example, the provision preventing disclaimers of im-
plied warranties would apply.
18. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(c),(d) (1979).
19. Id. § 700.1(e),(f).
20. Id. § 700.1(h). This application of the Act might result in less protection for
consumers. To avoid the red tape of the Act, some repairers will stop giving warranties
on parts.
21. Id. § 700.3(c).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(0 (1976); 16 C.F.R. § 700.4 (1979).
23. 16 C.F.R. § 700.4 (1979). See text accompanying note 200 infra.
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constitute written warranties under the Act.24 An example should
clarify the distinction. Suppose a supplier of a consumer product
states the energy efficiency rating of the product or gives instruc-
tions on how the product should be maintained. Such statements
constitute express warranties under state law because they are
promises with respect to the goods and form part of the basis of
the bargain.2 5 Such statements, however, are not written warran-
ties under the Act. To be a written warranty, the statement must
be one of three types. First, a statement is a written warranty if
it provides that the goods are defect free. Neither statement does
this. Second, it is a written warrarity if it provides that the goods
will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period
of time. Neither statement does this because neither contains a
time period. Third, a statement is a written warranty if it obli-
gates the warrantor to repair or replace the product if it fails to
meet the specifications contained in the undertaking. Neither
statement obligates the warrantor to take remedial action.
2
1
While the Act is far from clear, advertisements as to the
quality of products probably do not constitute written warranties.
A written warranty must be made "in connection with a sale."27
Advertisements do not seem to comply with this requirement
because they are only indirect factors in many sales. Further, the
Act seems to draw a distinction between advertisements and writ-
ten warranties because it authorizes the Commission to prescribe
rules for the presentation of information "with respect to any
written warranty. . . when such information is contained in ad-
vertisements.' "
To be a written warranty, the affirmation, promise or under-
taking must constitute part of the "basis of the bargain" between
the supplier and the consumer.2 The intent of this requirement
is unclear. One interpretation is that it was intended to incorpo-
rate the concept of the "basis of the bargain" found in the express
warranty section of the U.C.C.3 ° The difficulty with this interpre-
tation is that many courts have construed this provision as requir-
24. 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(b) (1979).
25. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313 (1976).
26. 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(b) (1979).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1976).
28. Id. § 2302(b)(1)(B).
29. Id. § 2301(6).
30. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313 (1976).
19801
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ing proof of reliance by the buyer." In the context of written
warranties that consumers often never read, this interpretation
could present problems. A better interpretation is that the intent
of the requirement was to clarify when component-part suppliers
and dealers make written warranties within the meaning of the
Act. A warranty made by a component-part supplier is not part
of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a consumer
unless the warranty is intended to run to the consumer. Thus, a
warranty by a manufacturer of a refrigerator that is installed in
a boat constitutes a written warranty to the consumer, while a
warranty on the material used in the hull does not.32 A written
warranty by a manufacturer does not constitute part of the basis
of the bargain between the dealer and the consumer unless the
dealer "adopts" the warranty.33
While the Act provides that it only applies to consumer prod-
ucts manufactured after July 4, 1975, many pre-Act products are
.subject to regulation. 3' The Commission has the authority to pro-
mulgate rules dealing with warranties and warranty practices in
connection with the sale of used motor vehicles, regardless of date
of manufacture.35 The Commission has promulgated a regulation
providing for coverage of pre-Act products that are repaired or
rebuilt after the effective date of the Act.
36
Written warranties subject to the Magnuson-Moss Act are
divided into full and limited warranties.37 For products that cost
more than ten dollars, the warrantor must designate on the face
of the written warranty whether it is full (duration of warranty)
or limited.38 For products that cost less than ten dollars, the war-
rantor may designate the type of warranty, but this is not re-
quired. If the product costs less than ten dollars and no designa-
tion is made, it is in effect a limited warranty.
While the term "full" implies a warranty without restric-
tions, the term is a misnomer. As the discussion below shows, full
warranties may contain substantial restrictions. In fact, the dif-
ference between full and limited warranties is much smaller than
31. See text accompanying notes 86-91 infra.
32. 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(c) (1979).
33. Id. § 700.4.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2312(a) (1976); 16 C.F.R. § 700.2 (1979).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (1976). See Part IV. B. 3. infra.
36. 16 C.F.R. § 700.2 (1979).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1976).
38. Id. § 2303(a),(d); 16 C.F.R. § 700.6 (1979).
[Vol. 31
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one would expect from the terms.
2. Full Written Warranties. - The Act provides that if a
manufacturer makes a full warranty it must comply with certain
minimum standards.39 If a warranty is denominated a full war-
ranty, it is deemed to incorporate these standards, regardless of
the actual terms of the warranty." To comply with minimum
standards the warranty must meet four requirements.
First, the warranty must provide that the warrantor will rem-
edy any nonconformity within a reasonable time without charge
to the consumer." Related to this is the requirement that a full
warranty may not impose any duty, other than notification, on
the consumer unless the warrantor can demonstrate that such a
duty is reasonable.2 The Commission has issued for comment a
proposed rule that provides guidance to warrantors as to what
duties are reasonable. 3 Second, a full warranty may not include
a disclaimer of implied warranties nor impose any limitation on
the duration of implied warranties." Third, the warranty may not
39. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1976).
40. Id. § 2304(e).
41. Id. § 2304(a)(1). The Act and regulations provide some guidance as to the mean-
ing of "without charge." The regulations state that if the product only has utility when
installed, a full warranty must provide for installation free of charge. 16 C.F.R. § 700.9
(1979). The Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(d) (1976), states that the warrantor is not required to
compensate the consumer for incidental expenses. The term "incidental expenses" is not
defined in the Act and the legislative history is silent. It could refer to incidental damages
as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-715(1) (1976), but if
so, it would considerably water down the "without charge" concept because of the breadth
of the U.C.C. definition. Apparently the Commission does not think that this is the
meaning because one of the proposed rules defining duties that a full warrantor may not
impose on a consumer provides that the warrantor must reimburse the consumer for
transportation expenses, which would be an incidental expense under the U.C.C. defini-
tion. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,223 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 705).
It seems inconsistent with the policy of the Act to read the term "without charge" as
broadly as the U.C.C. definition of "incidental damages." A better interpretation is that
incidental expenses are costs incurred as a result of a product failure but not costs incurred
in order to get the product remedied. Thus, a warranty provides for remedy without charge
even if the warrantor need not reimburse the consumer for lost wages as a result of a
product failure, but it provides for a charge if the consumer is not entitled to reimburse-
ment for towing the vehicle to a repair shop. In essence, the term "incidental expenses"
should be read to mean "consequential damages" as defined in the U.C.C. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 36-2-715 (1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (1976).
43. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,223 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 705).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308(a) (1976). The rationale for the Act's prohibition
on disclaimers whenever a written warranty is made is protection of reasonable buyer
expectations. Buyers naturally assume that written warranties provide them greater pro-
tection than no warranty. Yet, without a written warranty, the consumer would have the
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exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of written or
implied warranties unless such limitation appears conspicuously
on the face of the warranty." The right to limit consequential
damages, however, is also subject to state-law restrictions. 6 In
most states, including South Carolina, attempts to limit conse-
quential damages for personal injuries or property damage are
ineffective." The clause probably would be effective, however, to
bar consequential economic damages, such as lost wages resulting
from a breakdown in a car. 8 Fourth, a warranty must provide
that if the warrantor is unable to remedy the defect after a reason-
able number of attempts, the consumer has a right to elect a
refund or replacement of the product. 9 The section authorizes the
Commission to provide by rule what constitutes a reasonable
number of attempts for different consumer products. The Com-
mission, however, has not promulgated any rules under the sec-
tion, and the prospect of quick action is unlikely.
Even under a full warranty the warrantor may modify and
control its liability to some extent. The-express warranty portion
of the full warranty may have a limited duration. 0 Nothing in the
minimum standards prevents a full warranty from being limited
to repair of the product, so long as the warrantor is bound to allow
the consumer to elect a refund or replacement if the defect cannot
be remedied after a reasonable number of attempts. Further, the
warrantor is not required to perform its duties under a full war-
ranty if it can show that the damage to the product resulted from
causes other than a defect or malfunction, for example, from a
failure to provide reasonable and necessary maintenance.5'
3. Limited Written Warranties. - Any written warranty on
a consumer product that is not a full warranty is a limited war-
ranty."2 There are no minimum standards for limited warranties,
but there are some restrictions on their provisions. Subject to
protection of the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability, while a written warranty
that contains limitations may be less generous than the implied warranty. H.R. REP. No.
1107, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 40 reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702,
7722.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1976).
46. See id. § 2311(b)(1).
47. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(3) (1976).
48. Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1976).
50. Id. § 2303(a)(1).
51. Id. § 2304(c).
52. Id. § 2303(a)(2).
[Vol. 31
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these restrictions, the warrantor is free to determine the terms of
the warranty. First, a limited warranty may not contain a com-
plete disclaimer of implied warranties.13 The Act, however, allows
a limited warrantor to limit the duration of implied warranties to
the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration, if such
limitation is conscionable, set forth in clear and unmistakable
language, and prominently displayed on the face of the war-
ranty.
54
Second, the limited warranty, like the full warranty, may
limit remedies to repair of the product. This right, however, is
subject to restrictions on limitations on remedies imposed by
state law.55 Under the U.C.C., if a limited remedy "fails of its
essential purpose," the limitation is ineffective." Most courts
have held that a limitation on remedies fails of its essential pur-
pose if the warrantor fails to repair a defect after a reasonable
number of attempts.57
Third, the warranty may, like the full warranty, limit or
exclude consequential damages. Once again such limitations are
subject to restrictions imposed by state law. Under the U.C.C. a
limitation or exclusion of consequential damages is unconsciona-
ble if it applies to personal injuries but is probably valid when
applied to economic loss. 5
4. Other Magnuson-Moss Act Requirements. - The above
discussion has focused on two aspects of the Magnuson-Moss Act:
designation of warranties as either full or limited and limitations
on the substantive provisions of written warranties. The Act con-
tains other provisions dealing with written warranties. While
these are more important to the lawyer drafting a consumer prod-
uct warranty rather than one involved in litigation, a brief sum-
mary of the provisions for sake of completeness of discussion of
the Act is worthwhile.
(a) Disclosure requirements. - Whether the warrantor
chooses to make a full or limited warranty, the Act provides that
if the product costs more than fifteen dollars, the warrantor must
53. Id. § 2308(a).
54. Id. § 2308(b). For a discussion of this provision see Part I. A. 2 infra.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1976).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(2) (1976).
57. E.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973). See also
Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of U.C.C.
Section 2-719(2), 65 CAuF. L. Rav. 28, 72 n. 158 (1977).
58. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(3) (1976).
19801
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"fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily under-
stood language the terms and conditions of such warranty." 9 The
Act authorizes the Commission to promulgate rules regarding
disclosure of warranty terms and conditions, and outlines provi-
sions that the regulations may cover. The Commission has pro-
mulgated final disclosure regulations."
(b) Informal dispute resolution mechanisms. - The
Act authorizes either full or limited warrantors to create informal
dispute resolution mechanisms so as to promote nonadversarial
resolution of warranty disputes." Commission regulations con-
tain requirements that are designed to promote fairness and effi-
ciency in such mechanisms." A mechanism must be adequately
staffed and funded; it must be sufficiently insulated from the
warrantor to assure independent*decisionmaking; and individuals
who decide disputes must comply with conflict of interest rules.
3
If a mechanism exists, -and if the warranty so provides, the
consumer may not bring a lawsuit for breach of warranty under
the Act unless he exhausts his remedies under the mechanism.
64
Because the mechanism is generally required to reach a decision
within forty days, this requirement is not particularly burden-
some. 5
The decision of the mechanism is not legally binding, but the
regulations require the warrantor to act in good faith in deciding
whether to comply with the decision.66 Nevertheless, the decision
does have legal significance in two ways: first, it is admissible
evidence in subsequent litigation, and second, any information
obtained by the mechanism in its investigation must be made
available to the parties. At this time no mechanism that com-
plies with the Act has been established. Whether warrantors will
conclude that a mechanism is economically worthwhile remains
in doubt.6"
59. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (1976); see 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (1979).
60. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1-701.4 (1979).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (1976). See also 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1979).
62. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1979).
63. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(i) (1976).
65. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(d) (1979).
66. Id. § 703.5(0).
67. Id. § 703.5(g).
68. Ford has been experimenting with a procedure like a mechanism in North Caro-
lina. See Ford News Release, Sept. 22, 1977 (on file with author). See generally Note,
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(c) Anti-tie-in provisions. - Products that cost more
than five dollars, whether sold under full or limited warranties,
are subject to the anti-tie-in provision of the Act. 9 The general
purpose of this section is to foster competition in the repair and
service of consumer products. Subject to waiver by the Commis-
sion, the section prohibits a warrantor from conditioning any
implied or written warranty on the consumer using any service or
product that is identified by brand, corporate, or trade name,
unless such product or service is provided without charge under
the terms of the warranty. 0 For example, a manufacturer of vac-
uum cleaners is prohibited from conditioning its warranty on the
consumer using only "Genuine Zippy Bags." The company, how-
ever, could condition its warranty on the use of "standard No. 10
vacuum bags." If a warranty provides only for repair or replace-
ment of defective parts, but does not cover labor charges, the
section prohibits the warrantor from requiring the consumer to
have the work done only at designated dealers. However, if labor
charges are included in the warranty, such a designation is not
prohibited because it is "provided without charge to the con-
sumer.""
(d) Presale availability of warranties. - The Act re-
quires the Commission to establish rules providing when the
terms of written warranties must be made available to consumers
prior to sale. 2 The Commission has promulgated a presale availa-
bility of warranty rule that requires the seller of a consumer prod-
uct that costs more than fifteen dollars to make available to the
buyer the text of the warranty prior to the time of sale. The rule
requires manufacturers who make written warranties to provide
sellers with warranty materials to enable them to comply with the
rule. 3
Incentives for Warrantor Formation of Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 52 S.
CAL. L. REv. 235 (1978).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (1976).
70. See Application of Sohmer & Co., 40 Fed. Reg. 49,409 (1975), denied, 41 Fed. Reg.
17,821 (1976).
71. 16 C.F.R. § 700.10 (1979).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (1976).
73. 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1979). The Commission has dealt with numerous petitions for
interpretations on how the requirement could be met.
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B. Other Warranties: Express Warranties and
Implied Warranties Governed Only by the U.C.C.
Even if a transaction does not involve a "written warranty"
as defined in the Magnuson-Moss Act, a warranty under the Uni-
form Commercial Code may exist. The U.C.C. codifies three war-
ranties that relate to the quality of consumer goods-express war-
ranties," implied warranties of merchantability, 7 and implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose." In addition, the
Code creates a warranty of the title of consumer goods. 7 For
example, if a consumer purchases a used car from a dealer, the
consumer has a cause of action for breach of the warranty of title
in the event the vehicle was stolen. This warranty presents few
substantive problems and is not discussed further in this article.
1. Express Warranties. -. Express warranties that do not
constitute written warranties may be created in a variety of ways:
oral promises made by sales personnel, 78 advertisements, 7 mod-
els,"0 descriptions contained in contracts of sale,8 ' or labels.82 For
a representation to constitute an express warranty, it must be
part of the "basis of the bargain." 3 One issue that arises from this
requirement is whether the representation is material or consti-
tutes mere sales talk or "puffing." 4 This is'a question of fact that
depends on a variety of factors such as the specificity of the
representation and the buyer's reliance.
8 5
A problem that has divided courts is whether the consumer
must have relied on any representation for it to constitute part
of the basis of the bargain.6 Some have held that reliance is
required. This approach precludes recovery in cases like those
involving advertisements that the purchaser did not know
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313 (1976).
75. Id. § 36-2-314.
76. Id. § 36-2-315.
77. Id. § 36-2-312.
78. Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 644-45 (Ind. App. 1976).
79. Eddington v. Dick, 87 Misc. 2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180 (City Ct. 1976).
80. Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 644-45 (Ind. App. 1976).
81. Antonucci v. Stevens Dodge, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 173, 176-77, 340 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983
(Civ. Ct. 1973).
82. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313 (1976).
84. Id. § 36-2-313(2).
85. Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affl'd, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.
1978).
86. Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 Iil. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976).
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about. 7 Other courts have concluded that the U.C.C. modifies
the reliance requirement by creating a rebuttable presumption
that affirmations of the seller become part of the basis of the
bargain." A third group of courts have concluded that the U.C.C.
does not require reliance; instead, the seller is required to perform
those obligations that a reasonable person would conclude the
seller had undertaken, regardless of the buyer's reliance.
Courts should reject the reliance requirement and adopt the
third test. This interpretation tends to be supported by the draft-
ing history of the U.C.C. and is more consistent with the realities
of contract formation in modern society. Under the Uniform Sales
Act, the predecessor to the U.C.C., the buyer had to establish
reliance in order to recover for breach of express warranty.'" Al-
though the intent of the drafters of the Code is far from clear,
elimination of this requirement in the U.C.C. supports the third
test." Further, the reliance test rests on an antiquated conception
of contract formation - contracts result from face-to-face deal-
ings between buyers and sellers in which the words and conduct
of sellers influence decisions by buyers. While many contracts are
formed this way, in a mass communication society, contract for-
mation is often much more subtle. A variety of factors that are
difficult to pinpoint in an individual case influence the decisions
of buyers. The third test corresponds to this reality.
2. Implied Warranties of Merchantability. - If the seller is
a merchant with respect to goods of the kind sold, the contract
contains an implied warranty that the goods will be merchanta-
ble. 2 The concept of merchantability (or the related concept in
tort law, defectiveness) poses many difficult questions in personal
87. E.g., Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Hagenbuch
v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972).
88. E.g., Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766-68 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 568 F.2d
770 (3d Cir. 1978).
89. See, e.g., Winston Indus., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So.
2d 493 (Civ. App. 1975); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d
643 (1973); Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, 572 P.2d 1322
(1977).
90. UNIFORM SALES ACr § 12.
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313 (1976) (Official Comment 3). See J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 277-82 (1972) (history of the "reliance" requirement
and its status under the Code).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 (1976). See id. § 36-2-104(1) (meaning of"merchant");
McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974) (service station operator who sold
recaps on request held a merchant); Donald v. City Nat'l Bank, 295 Ala. 320, 329 So. 2d
92 (1976) (bank that resold boat after repossession not a merchant).
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injury cases because the level of safety that a product must meet
is a complex question that involves analysis of economic factors
and buyer expectations.'3 In economic loss cases the concept is
much less difficult to apply. Consumer products have clear func-
tions. If the goods do not serve the function, they are unmerchant-
able. However, there are some questions about the application of
the implied warranty of merchantability to used goods and non-
sale transactions.
The application of the implied warranty of merchantability
to used goods is unclear. While some courts have held that the
warranty does not apply," this result seems incorrect. The draf-
ters of the U.C.C. did not distinguish between new and used
goods. 5 Further, this approach seems inconsistent with probable
expectations of buyers and sellers of used goods. A reasonable
buyer probably assumes that used goods are in good condition
unless told otherwise; a reasonable seller probably believes that
it has some obligation as to the quality of used goods unless it
informs the buyer otherwise.
Still, it is undoubtedly true that neither buyers nor sellers
expect used goods to be of the same quality as new products. To
reflect the difference in expectations between new and used
goods, courts should distinguish between basic operating parts
and other aspects of the goods, such as appearance or accessories.
The warranty of merchantability should apply to the former but
not the latter. This standard makes an appropriate distinction
between new and used goods and seems to conform to reasonable
expectations. Thus, in a used automobile, the engine should be
subject to the warranty, but not the radio.
An interesting question is whether used goods are not mer-
chantable if the seller fails to disclose some relevant fact about
the goods, regardless of their condition. For example, suppose a
used automobile has been used for racing purposes but the seller
93. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 91, at 289-95; Montgomery & Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective
Products, 27 S.C.L. Rav. 803, 808-24 (1976).
94. E.g., Trax, Inc. v. Tidmore, 331 So. 2d 275 (Ala. 1976) (intimating that implied
warranty of merchantability does not exist in sale of used vehicle); Valley Datsun v.
Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
95. Most courts have held that the implied warranty of merchantability does apply
to used goods. See generally Roupp v. Acor, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 384 A.2d 968 (1978);
Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976); Editor's
Note, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 92 (1976).
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does not inform the buyer of this. To be merchantable, goods
must pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription. 6 Vehicles that have been used for racing or have been
involved in accidents are not "normal" used cars. Undoubtedly
a dealer or consumer would "object" to being sold such a car
without disclosure of its history. Courts should conclude that a
failure to disclose such information results in a breach of the
warranty of merchantability.1
An additional unsettled question is whether the implied war-
ranty98 of merchantability applies to nonsale transactions such as
leases or the rendition of services. 9 If a lease is sufficiently like a
sale, the implied warranty of merchantability contained in the
U.C.C. applies.' Generally, a lease will be treated like a sale if
the lessee has the option to purchase at the end of the lease term
for a nominal consideration or if the lessee is contractually obli-
gated to pay the equivalent of the purchase price through lease
payments.10' If services are rendered incident to the sale of goods
and if the predominate thrust of the transaction is a sale rather
than the rendition of services, the implied warranty of the U.C.C.
applies.' 0
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314(2)(a) (1976).
97. Compare Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d
349 (1976) (implied warranty breached when sold as used car when in fact had been
substantially modified for racing purposes) with Johnson v. Fore River Motors, Inc., 4
U.C.C. REP. SEav. 696 (Mass. App. Div. 1967) (failure to disclose that car has been in
accident does not constitute breach of warranty). Even if failure to disclose such informa-
tion does not constitute a breach of warranty, it might constitute fraud. See text at notes
305-10 infra.
98. In either a lease or service transaction, it is clear that express warranties are
enforceable as a matter of contract; the question is whether the implied warranty of
merchantability applies to such transactions.
99. See Murry, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 39 FORDHAM L. Rav. 447 (1971); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-
Sale Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957).
100. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31 (1974) (lease
of equipment subject to implied warranty when lessee had option to purchase at end of
term for nominal consideration).
101. C.f. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(37) (1976) (standard for when lease will be
treated as conditional sale). See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973).
102. There are no South Carolina Supreme Court cases concerning whether a contract
that involves both services as well as the sale of goods is subject to the U.C.C. The federal
district court, however, has twice concluded that the test for determining whether such
contracts are subject to the Code is whether their predominant thrust is the rendition of
services or the sale of goods. Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., 433 F. Supp. 442
(D.S.C. 1977); Computer Servicecenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653
(D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
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It is arguable, however, that an implied warranty of mer-
chantability analagous to that in the U.C.C. applies to true leases
and pure service transactions. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has created common-law implied warranties on several oc-
casions."' 3 Further, it seems reasonable to do so in true leases and
service transactions because the parties to such transactions
probably expect that the goods or services will be of good quality.
The implied warranty of merchantability reflects this expecta-
tion.
3. Implied Warranties of Fitness for a Particular Purpose.
-The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is quite
different from the implied warranty of merchantability, although
the two are often confused. The warranty of fitness applies if the
buyer has special needs, the seller has reason to know of these
needs, and the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment in
selecting a product to meet these requirements."4 The seller is not
required to be a merchant, nor is it necessary for the product to
be defective. For example, suppose a consumer purchased an
insecticide for use in her garden. If the insecticide was defective
and damaged her plants, she could recover for breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, but not for breach of the war-
ranty of fitness because she did not have special needs that were
communicated to the seller. However, if the buyer told the seller
that she needed an insecticide for azaleas and the seller selected
an inappropriate chemical that damaged the plants, she could
recover for breach of the warranty of fitness.
I1. WHAT CONSTITUTES BREACH
A. Written Warranties
Determining whether a written warranty has been breached
is complicated because the typical written warranty consists of
both an express warranty of limited duration and an implied
warranty.0 5 Thus, analysis of both aspects of the written war-
103. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976) (common-law
implied warranty in sale of new home); Colcock v. Goode, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 513 (1826)
(common-law implied warranty in hire of slave for one year). See also S.C. CODE ANN. §
36.1-103 (1976) (to extent not displaced by U.C.C., common-law doctrine continues to
apply).
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-315 (1976); see McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271,
1275-78 (D.S.C. 1974) (distinction between the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose).
105. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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ranty must be considered. In the discussion that follows goods are
referred to as "in warranty" if the period of the express warranty
portion of the written warranty has not expired. They are referred
to as "out of warranty" if such period has expired, regardless of
the existence of implied warranties. Such definitions correspond
to common usage. '
1. Breach When Goods are "In Warranty." - (a) Full
warranties. - Breach of the typical full warranty requires the
consumer to establish' 7 two elements: (1) a product malfunction
within the warranty period that is caused by defects in materials
or workmanship;"' and (2) failure by the warrantor to provide the
consumer with a proper "remedy" as required by the Magnuson-
Moss Act. '
Proof that the product malfunction was caused by defects in
materials or workmanship does not require expert testimony. The
consumer satisfies this requirement by showing a malfunction
that does not normally occur unless the product was defective.110
The warrantor is not responsible for a product malfunction that
results from consumer fault, such as product misuse or failure to
provide proper maintenance. The warrantor, however, has the
burden of establishing that this was the cause of any product
failure."'
The second requirement that a consumer must establish in
order to prove breach of a full warranty is failure of the warrantor
to comply with its obligations to provide a remedy. In the event
a product malfunction occurs that is caused by defects in materi-
als or workmanship, the warrantor has several remedial options.
It may repair or replace the product. With consent of the con-
sumer it may provide a refund. Even without the consumer's
consent it may provide a refund if it is unable to give a replace-
106. C. RErrz, CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT 68
(1978).
107. The buyer has the burden of proving breach of warranty for goods that have been
accepted. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(4) (1976).
108. This assumes that the warranty obligates the manufacturer to remedy a mal-
function that is caused by defects in materials or workmanship. This is the typical provi-
sion. See the automobile warranty in appendix B infra.
109. The Act defines a remedy to include refund, repair, or replacement. The Act,
however, limits the right of the warrantor to offer a refund to certain circumstances. 15
U.S.C. § 2301(10) (1976). See also id. § 2304(a)(4) (warrantor's remedial obligations under
a full warranty).
110. See text at notes 121-22 infra.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(c) (1976).
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ment and if repair is not commercially reasonable or cannot be
made timely."' The choice among these options depends on an
analysis of the economic consequences of each of the choices. If
the warrantor elects to repair the product, it must do so within a
reasonable number of attempts. Should the warrantor fail to
make the repair within this time period, the consumer has the
right to elect either a refund or a replacement.
13
A major issue that will arise is what constitutes a reasonable
number of attempts. While the Act gives the Federal Trade Com-
mission the power to define what constitutes a reasonable number
of attempts under a full written warranty, it has not done so.'" A
reasonable standard for a court to apply is that a failure to repair
after two attempts constitutes a breach of warranty entitling the
consumer to pursue remedies for breach. Because of the complex-
ity of many consumer products, it may be difficult to pinpoint the
problem on the first attempt. The second attempt gives the war-
rantor the opportunity to remedy such problems. Further at-
tempts should not be allowed because the consumer should not
be put to excessive inconvenience and because a failure to make
repairs in two attempts is some evidence that the consumer has
purchased a "lemon."' 5
In applying this standard the courts should hold that an
attempt occurs when the product is returned to the consumer
with an indication that the problem has been corrected. Failure
to return the product to the consumer within the time that is
ordinary in the trade for repair should also constitute a breach.
(b) Limited warranties. - The requirements for proof of
breach of a limited warranty are conceptually different from
those for a full warranty, but practically speaking, the elements
112. The Federal Trade Commission has the authority to promulgate rules that
would allow warrantors to deduct from the amount of any refund a reasonable amount
for depreciation. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(12) (1976). The Commission initiated a rulemaking
proceeding under this section but recently terminated the proceeding after determining
that promulgation of a rule at this time would not be in the public interest. 43 Fed. Reg.
4054 (1978).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1976). See Pratt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 463 F. Supp.
709 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (rescission not allowed under Magnuson-Moss Act because warrantor
not given opportunity to repair).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1976).
115. See Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 75 CoM. L.J.
354, 358 (1970) (arguing for one attempt but stating that the seller should certainly be
permitted to make further attempts within the scope of his single attempt right, provided
the overall attempt is concluded within a reasonable time).
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are identical. The typical limited warranty, like the typical full
warranty, obligates the warrantor to repair the product if a mal-
function occurs within the warranty period because of defects in
materials or workmanship. Unlike the full warranty, the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not provide standards concerning the
remedial obligations of the warrantor in the event a product mal-
function occurs. Typically, the warranty provides that the war-
rantor will repair the product. This raises the question of when
the warrantor breaches this repair obligation. Under the U.C.C.
a consumer has the right to pursue remedies for breach of war-
ranty when a limited remedy fails of its "essential purpose."" 6
Most courts have decided that this occurs when the warrantor
fails to make repairs after a reasonable number of attempts."7
Thus, the result of this analysis is that the standard for breach
of both full and limited warranties is the same: failure to repair
the product after a reasonable number of attempts when the
malfunction resulted from defects in materials or workmanship.
This is not to say, however, that the warranties are the same.
Remedies for breach of full and limited warranties differ. For
breach of a full warranty the consumer is entitled to a refund or
replacement of the product."' A consumer may have narrower
rights for breach of a limited warranty."'
2. Breach When Goods are "Out of Warranty. - If the
goods are "out of warranty" the consumer's only option to obtain
legal relief is to claim that an implied warranty was breached. To
prove breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the
consumer must show that the goods were defective at the time of
sale. Most courts have allowed consumers to prove this through
circumstantial evidence. Expert testimony has not been required.
The general view seems to be that the consumer proves a prima
facie case if he establishes a product malfunction that does not
normally occur unless the product was defective, and if he rebuts
other equally plausible explanations.'20 Two cases illustrate the
principle. In Sauers v. Tibbs,'2' the plaintiff sued for breach of
warranty in connection with the sale of a mobile home, claiming
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(2) (1976).
117. See note 57 supra.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1976).
119. See text at notes 133-42 infra.
120. Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975).
121. 48 Ill. App. 3d 805, 363 N.E.2d 444 (1977).
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that the home was infested with beetles. Defendant argued that
the beetles infested the home after the date of sale because of poor
housekeeping. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff
had established breach of warranty when it showed that the ges-
tation period of beetles made it likely that they had infested the
home at the time of sale. By contrast, in Kriedler v. Pontiac
Division of General Motors Corporation'2 the court ordered a
directed verdict for the defendant in a case in which the plaintiff
sued for breach of warranty when the engine in his car burned up.
Defendant proved that the plaintiff had taken the car to a service
station for repair and that the fire could have resulted from im-
proper repair. Plaintiff was unable to offer rebutting testimony.
Under a full warranty the warrantor may not limit the dura-
tion of implied warranties.12s Thus, even if the goods are "out of
warranty," the consumer may still bring suit for breach of im-
plied warranty until the expiration of the statute of limitations.
In South Carolina, which has a nonuniform amendment to the
U.C.C.'s statute of limitations section, suit may be brought at
any time within six years after the breach is or should have been
discovered.' 4
A limited warrantor, however, may limit the duration of im-
plied warranties to the duration of an express warranty of reason-
122. 514 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1976).
124. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725(1),(2) (1976). The uniform version of the section is
as follows:
Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the
parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may
not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1)
is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same
breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time
limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless
the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for
failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations
nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes
effective.
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able duration, provided such limitation is conscionable, set forth
in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed
on the face of the warranty.125 The Act apparently envisions the
following type of situation. Stereo manufacturer offers a limited
written warranty against defects in materials and workmanship
for a period of two years. The manufacturer may limit the dura-
tion of the implied warranty to as little as two years if this period
of time is reasonable and if the limitation is properly displayed.
The provision that allows limited warrantors to limit the
duration of implied warranties creates a conceptual problem be-
cause implied warranties actually do not have a duration. An
implied warranty is an obligation as to the quality of goods at the
time of sale. There are two possible interpretations that could be
offered to deal with this problem.
12
First, the section could be interpreted as giving the warrantor
the right to limit the period of time in which suit must be brought
for breach of the implied warranty. Such an interpretation should
be rejected because it would compel consumers who discovered
warranty problems near the end of the warranty period to file
lawsuits to protect their rights under implied warranties. This is
inconsistent with the provision of the Magnuson-Moss Act that
requires the warrantor to have a reasonable opportunity to cure
defects before a suit is brought,1 2 as well as the policy of the Act
to promote settlement of warranty claims rather than litigation.' 2
Further, this interpretation of the Act would render such limita-
tions ineffective in South Carolina. The Magnuson-Moss Act pre-
serves rights and remedies that consumers have under state
law.12' The South Carolina version of the U.C.C. prevents a war-
rantor from shortening the statute of limitations for breach of
warranty by contract.
13
1
The second interpretation is that the section gives the lim-
ited warrantor the right to define the period of time in which it
125. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1976).
126. For another analysis of this problem see C. RErrz, supra note 106, at 67-71.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e). (1976).
128. See id. § 2310(a)(1).
129. Id. § 2311(b)(1); Letter from Rachel Miller, attorney, Federal Trade Commission
Division of Special Statutes, to Philip T. Lacy, Ass't Professor of Law, University of South
Carolina School of Law (Sept. 13, 1977).
130. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725(1) (1976). The uniform version provides: "By the
original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one
year but may not extend it."
1980]
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is reasonable for a consumer to discover any breach of implied
warranty. The result of this interpretation would be to bar reme-
dies for breach of warranty by a buyer who did not discover the
breach within the period of the limited warranty. The preclusion
of remedies would result because under the U.C.C. a buyer must
notify the warrantor of a breach within a reasonable time after
discovery or be barred from any remedy. 31 For example, suppose
a stereo manufacturer gives a written warranty which has a two-
year warranty against defects along with a three-year limitation
on the duration of implied warranties. If a defect occurs during
the third year and the consumer notifies the warrantor, the con-
sumer would be allowed to bring suit for breach of the implied
warranty. The suit could be brought within six years from the
date of discovery. If the defect did not occur until the fourth year,
the consumer could not sue for breach of the implied warranty
because the consumer failed to discover the defect within the
three-year period.
One might object that this interpretation is unfair to con-
sumers because it might prevent a consumer from suing for
breach of an implied warranty even though the defect was not
discovered until after the period expired. This objection is un-
sound. Consumers are protected against unreasonably short limi-
tation periods because the Act provides that a limitation on the
duration of implied warranties is enforceable only if the limita-
tion of time is reasonable.' 31 Presumably this means that if sta-
tistical evidence shows that few defects appear within the period
of time that the warrantor has given, the limitation of the implied
warranty would be unreasonable.
Assuming the period of time is reasonable, the consumer has
no right to complain because the consumer received a product
that worked well for a reasonable time. In such a situation the
malfunction is often due to wear and tear rather than defective-
ness at the time of sale. The function of the limitation on duration
clause is to prevent having to decide which is the case. Thus, the
interpretation that is offered fosters a reasonable purpose of war-
ranties, namely avoiding the expense of making difficult determi-
nations as to the cause of product failures when the product has
been used for a period of time.
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (1976).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1976).
316 [Vol. 3i
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B. Warranties that are not Subject to
the Magnuson-Moss Act
If a warranty is not governed by the Magnuson-Moss Act,
breach depends on the terms of the warranty. For express warran-
ties, little can be said because they follow no particular pattern.
In most instances, the determination of breach should not be
difficult. For example, a lawyer should have little problem decid-
ing if an oral warranty to refund money when the product is
returned within seven days has been breached. The standard for
breach of implied warranties has already been discussed above in
connection with breach of written warranties that are "out of
warranty."
III. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
A. Remedy for Breach of Full Written
Warranties that are "In Warranty"
The Magnuson-Moss Act creates a cause of action on behalf
of a consumer "who is damaged by the failure of a supplier,
warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation
under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied war-
ranty, or service contract. 13 3 Suit may be brought for "damages
and other legal and equitable relief .... 134 In connection with
such a suit, if the consumer prevails, he is generally entitled to
recovery of attorney's fees. 135 The Act provides that both federal
and state courts have jurisdiction over such actions, but because
of the monetary limitations on federal-court jurisdiction, most
economic loss cases for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act must
be brought in state court.'
3
If goods are "in warranty" under a full warranty, the con-
sumer's basic remedy for breach is clear. The Act provides that
a full warrantor must provide the consumer a right to a refund
or replacement if repair is not made after a reasonable number
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976).
134. Id.
135. Id. at (d)(2).
136. No claim may be brought in federal court unless the amount in controversy
exceeds $50,000. Id. § 2310(d)(3)(B); Novosel v. Northway Motor Car Corp., 460 F. Supp.
541 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (dismissing claim for breach of warranty seeking $9,638 actual and
$50,000 punitive damages for failure to meet jurisdictional requirement). By contrast,
many personal-injury cases may now be brought in federal court regardless of diversity of
citizenship.
1980]
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of attempts. 3 ' This is "an obligation under this chapter." A court
could order the warrantor to comply with this obligation and
could award attorney's fees to the consumer. However, two addi-
tional issues require analysis. May the remedy be asserted against
a third party, such as the dealer or a financing entity, as well as
against the warrantor? May the consumer recover incidental or
consequential damages in addition to the basic remedy? These
issues are discussed below.'38
B. Remedies for Breach of Limited Warranties,
Express Warranties and Implied Warranties
The Magnuson-Moss Act provides that a consumer may re-
cover under the Act for breach of a limited warranty, implied
warranty, or service contract. Breach of an oral express warranty
is not covered by the Act.'39 Attorneys should bring other actions
for breach of warranty under the Act because it provides for re-
covery of attorney's fees. The Act entitles a consumer who has
been damaged by breach of any such warranty to recover dam-
ages and other legal and equitable relief.' The Act, however,
does not provide guidance concerning what these remedies are.
The Uniform Commercial Code contains detailed provisions for
remedies for buyers in the event of breach of warranty.' A rea-
sonable approach is for courts to use these remedies as the basis
for relief under the Magnuson-Moss Act.'
1. Rejection or Revocation of Acceptance. - The most im-
portant remedy available to a consumer for breach of warranty
under the U.C.C. is cancellation of the contract and recovery of
so much of the purchase price as has been paid. 3 To be entitled
to this remedy the consumer must either have rejected the goods
or revoked acceptance.' A consumer has the right to reject the
137. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1976).
138. See Part III. E. infra (remedies against third parties), and Part III. C. infra
(incidental and consequential damages).
139. H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 26 reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 7702, 7758 (rejection of Senate version that would have allowed actions
for breach of oral express warranties).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976).
141. The U.C.C.'s remedy provisions may be found in S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-601 to
-725 (1976).
142. See Novosel v. Northway Motor Car Corp., 460 F. Supp. 541 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
143. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-711(1) (1976).
144. Id.
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goods at anytime before "acceptance.' 4 5 Acceptance occurs when
the consumer does any act inconsistent with the seller's owner-
ship or fails to discover a defect after a reasonable opportunity
to inspect.146 Because most cases for breach of written warranties
concern goods that consumers have used for a period of time, it
is likely that courts will conclude that the period of time for
rejection has passed. 47 Such a position is sound because the con-
sumer may still cancel the contract by complying with the re-
quirements for revocation of acceptance. These requirements
have been established to protect the seller when goods have been
used by consumers for a period of time.4 '
To revoke acceptance a buyer must satisfy five require-
ments.' First, if the goods do not conform to the contract, the
seller must be given a reasonable opportunity to cure any noncon-
formity. 50 If the warrantor has an opportunity to repair any de-
fects but fails to do so within a reasonable time, the seller's right
of cure is satisfied and the buyer may revoke.' 5' Second, the buyer
may revoke acceptance only if the nonconformity substantially
impairs the value of the goods to him."' The significance of the
nonconformity is appraised from the buyer's point of view."3
145. A buyer is entitled to reject "nonconforming" goods (e.g., goods that do not
comply with warranties) at anytime before "acceptance." Id. § 36-2-607(2).
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-606(1) (1976); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, Inc., 44
Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976).
147. But see Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976) (rejection allowed
despite continued occupancy).
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608 (1976). From a tactical point of view it might be
advisable for the attorney to style letters and pleadings in terms of rejection or revocation
alternatively because loss of the right of rejection has adverse consequences. For example,
the burden of proving breach is on the buyer if the goods have been accepted, otherwise
it is on the seller. Id. § 36-2-607(4).
149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608 (1976).
150. A literal reading of the U.C.C. does not support the proposition that a seller
always has the right to cure defective goods. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-508 (1976) gives a right
of cure only if the tender of nonconforming goods was made before the time for perform-
ance expired or when the buyer rejected a nonconforming tender that the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable to the buyer, with or without money
allowance. Nothing in id. § 36-2-608, which defines the right of revocation, requires the
buyer to give the seller an opportunity to cure before revoking acceptance. Nevertheless,
courts have either assumed or implied that the U.C.C. gives the seller a general right to
cure all defective products. In any event, in an action under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the
seller does have a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1976).
151. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 290, 224 So. 2d 638, 644 (1969)
(automobile returned for repair on thirty occasions; buyer deprived of possession for forty
to fifty days); Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 291, 545 P.2d 1382, 1385 (1976).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608(1) (1976).
153. Jorgensen v. Pressnall, 274 Or. 285, 289-90, 545 P.2d 1382, 1384-85 (1976); Ber-
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Thus, the mere fact that the cost of repair is small relative to the
purchase price is not determinative.'54 Instead, the question is
whether the nonconformity substantially interfered with the use
that the buyer intended for the goods. ' Third, the buyer must
either have accepted the goods without discovery of the noncon-
formity because the defect was latent or must have accepted the
goods based on the seller's assurances that the defects did not
exist or would be cured.'56 For new goods covered by written war-
ranties, this requirement should not be a problem because buyers
rarely accept a new product that is defective without some prom-
ise of prompt repair.
Fourth, revocation must occur within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers or should have discovered any defect and
before any substantial change in condition of the goods that is not
caused by their own defects.' A question that arises frequently
is whether continued use of the goods prevents revocation. Courts
generally hold that if the buyer continues to use the goods based
on the seller's repeated assurances that the defects will be cured,
revocation is still allowed. If the buyer uses the goods with knowl-
edge of the defects and not in reliance on the seller's promise to
cure, revocation is barred.' 8
genstock v. Lemay's G.M.C., Inc., 372 A.2d 69 (R.I. 1977).
154. Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 359, 292 N.E.2d 168,
176 (1972).
155. Compare Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 44 111. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382
(1976) (minor defect in trailer did not substantially impair value) and Reece v. Yeager
Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 461, 184 S.E.2d 727 (1971) (inexpensive repairs, no evidence
that repair would inconvenience plaintiff) with Sauers v. Tibbs, 48 Ill. App. 3d 805, 363
N.E.2d 444 (1977) (mobile homes infested with beetles and extermination proved unsuc-
cessful) and Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977) (succession
of minor defects sufficient impairment of value to warrant revocation).
156. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-608(1)(a),(b) (1976).
157. Id. § 36-2-608(2). E.g., Ebner v. Haverty Furniture Co., 128 S.C. 151, 122 S.E.
578 (1924) (rescission of contract for purchase of furniture not allowed when furniture
destroyed by fire before buyer learned that furniture not mahogany). If damage to the
goods is caused by the defect, for example, a car fire that is started by a defective battery,
revocation is still possible.
158. Compare Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 35 Colo. App.
196, 530 P.2d 989 (1975) (revocation allowed one year after purchase because of seller's
repeated assurances) and Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d
144 (1976) (revocation allowed fourteen months after purchase because of continuous
negotiation and repair attempts during period) with Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964) (revocation not allowed when buyer continued to drive
truck until it blew up despite knowledge that transmission not functioning properly) and
Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974) (revocation not allowed
28
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Fifth, revocation is not effective unless the buyer notifies the
seller.'59 While in commercial cases the courts have strictly con-
strued the notification requirement, in consumer cases the courts
seem to be more lenient. 0 -Thus, one court concluded that
" [a]ny conduct clearly- manifesting the buyer's desire to get his
money back is a sufficient notice to revoke."'' 1 Obviously, how-
ever, a formal written notification is desirable. The appendix
contains a notice of revocation of acceptance that attorneys could
use.
One question that arises is to whom notice must be sent -
the dealer, the manufacturer who made the written warranty, the
financer, or all three? Of course, if a consumer retains a lawyer
promptly, it is prudent for the lawyer to send the notice to all
persons against whom claims might be asserted. If the issue arises
in litigation, however, courts should hold that notice to the dealer
is sufficient notice to revoke acceptance. Several reasons support
this conclusion. First, the consumer naturally expects that the
dealer is the party who provides relief. Second, notice to the
dealer would seem to satisfy the purposes of the notice require-
ment, namely to provide an opportunity to investigate the claim
and make repairs. Third, the U.C.C. provides that notice must
be sent to the "seller,"' 6 and the dealer is the seller. 6 ' Finally,
when automobile driven for two years and 18,000 miles; damages limited to difference in
value).
The rule is based on the consideration of fairness to the seller. If revocation occurs,
the seller must take the product back and dispose of it. The longer the use, the more
difficult this becomes. See 35 Colo. App. at 202, 530 P.2d at 993. Even though continued
use will not necessarily prevent revocation, the seller may have a right to offset the value
of the use against damages due for revocation. Id.
159. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-608(2) (1976). The purpose of this requirement is to allow
the warrantor an opportunity to test for defects, preserve evidence and minimize loss.
160. Compare Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods. Inc., 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d 502 (1974) and
Desilets Granite Co. v. Stone Equalizer Corp., 133 Vt. 372, 340 A.2d 65 (1975) with
Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972) (numerous com-
plaints and cessation of payments constitute sufficient notice). Performance Motors over-
ruled lower court decisions that applied a stricter rule. See also Southeastern Steel Co. v.
Burton Block and Concrete Co., - S.C. _ , 258 S.E.2d 888 (1979) (written notice of
rejection required in commercial case).
While formal written notice is obviously preferable, notice may consist of an act such
as institution of a lawsuit or leaving the vehicle at the seller's place of business. Fenton
v. Contemporary Dev. Inc., 12 Wash. App. 345, 529 P.2d 883 (1974) (refusal to allow
additional repair efforts after repeated failures, institution of suit constitutes notice).
161. Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 49, 554 P.2d 349,
357 (1976).
162. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 36-2-608(2) (1976).
163. Id. § 36-2-103(d) (1976).
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notice to the dealer is not unfair to manufacturers and financing
entities. Such concerns have contractual relationships with deal-
ers. They can require dealers to forward notices to them.
2. Revocation of Acceptance Against Manufacturers. -
Some courts have held that a consumer is not entitled to revoke
acceptance against a manufacturer who makes a warranty when
goods are sold through retailers because there is no contractual
relationship between the manufacturer and the consumer. Such
courts reason that the consumer purchased the goods from the
retailer and should be required to pursue remedies against it. In
essence, these courts create a barrier of privity of contract to
revocation of acceptance. 1"
These decisions should not be followed for three reasons.
First, case law in South Carolina has rejected lack of privity as a
defense in a breach of warranty action."6 5 Second, such a rule
serves no useful purpose in the context of consumer product war-
ranties. Presumably, the reason for the rule is to force a buyer to
bring his complaint to the attention of his immediate seller. An
action for revocation of acceptance under the Magnuson-Moss
Act, however, cannot be brought until the warrantor has been
given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defect."' 8 This requires
the buyer to present the goods to the authorized representative
of the warrantor (who is often the seller) for repair. Finally, in
those instances where dealers are insolvent, the rule precludes
revocation of acceptance against anyone.
3. Direct Damages for Breach of Warranty. - Even if a
consumer is not entitled to cancel the contract, he may recover
damages for breach of warranty."' The measure of damages is the
difference between the value of the collateral as warranted and
its actual value. 6' Expert testimony is not necessary to prove the
difference in value because "[m]ost jurors, as average men, are
well informed about automobiles. They were capable of evaluat-
164. Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974).
Contra, Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977).
165. Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270 S.C.- 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978) (privity of
contract not a bar to action for breach of implied warranty seeking recovery of lost profits);
Spartanburg Hotel Corp. v. Smith, 231 S.C. 1, 97 S.E.2d 199 (1957) (lack of privity does
not bar action by remote purchaser against manufacturer under express-warranty theory).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1976).
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-714 (1976).
168. Id. § 36-2-714(2). See Long v. Quality Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 271 S.C. 482,
248 S.E.2d 311 (1978) (value as warranted does not include finance charges).
[Vol. 31
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss2/5
1980] WARRANTY LITIGATION
ing the evidence bearing on value . ... ,69 Proof of purchase
price is sufficient evidence of the value of the goods if they had
been as warranted. 170 Proof of resale price is sufficient evidence
of the value as accepted. 7 1 Proof of a reasonable repair cost
should also be sufficient evidence of the difference in value. 
172
C. Incidental and Consequential Damages
for Breach of Warranty
1. In General. - The Code allows the buyer to recover inci-
dental and consequential damages as well as direct economic
loss.'7 Incidental damages are expenses incurred in connection
with the breach, such as the expense of towing a disabled vehicle
to a repair shop.' Consequential damages are those that flow
from the breach, such as loss of use of a vehicle.' 75 Consequential
damages must be reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties and the buyer has a duty of mitigation. 76 While the
buyer's right to recover most consequential damages should be
fairly clear, it is uncertain whether a buyer may recover damages
for inconvenience, annoyance, aggravation, or mental distress.' 7
The fear seems to be that such damages are too speculative, but
in light of the general trend in tort law to allow recovery for
mental distress, this argument does not seem convincing. 7 Al-
though courts have generally denied recovery of attorney's fees as
169. Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet Co., 241 S.C. 508, 515, 129 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1963).
170. Draffin v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 252 S.C. 348, 166 S.E.2d 305 (1969).
171. Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet Co., 241 S.C. 508, 515, 129 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1963).
172. Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 383
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Davis-Pickett Chevrolet, Inc. v. Collier, 106 Ga. App. 660, 662 n.1, 127
S.E.2d 923, 925 n.1 (1962); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 647 (Ind. App. 1976). But
see Foremost Mobile Homes Mfg. Corp. v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-715 (1976).
174. See id. § 36-2-715(1).
175. See id. § 36-2-715(2); Bob Anderson Pontiac, Inc. v. Davidson, 155 Ind. App.
395, 293 N.E.2d 232 (1973); Long v. Quality Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 271 S.C. 482, 248
S.E.2d 311 (1978) (discussing recovery of consequential damages and holding that finance
charges are not a recoverable element).
176. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-715(2)(a) (1976) ("which could not reasonably be pre-
vented by cover or otherwise").
177. Compare Allen v. Edwards, 217 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1969) (not recoverable) with
McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46 111. App. 3d 136,360 N.E.2d 818 (1977) (recoverable
damage). Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Co., 230 S.C. 131, 94 S.E.2d 397 (1956) intimates that
such damages are not recoverable in South Carolina.
178. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 312 (1965) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
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a consequential damage,"' this limitation is not particularly sig-
nificant because of the right to recover fees under the Magnuson-
Moss Act.' 0 In South Carolina, unlike other states, punitive dam-
ages may be awarded in a breach of warranty case if the breach
is accompanied by a fraudulent act. '
2. Limitations on Recovery of Incidental and Consequential
Damages for Breach of Written Warranties. - Under the
Magnuson-Moss Act a limited warranty may include a clause
excluding liability for incidental damages. While clauses limiting
remedies are subject to restrictions imposed by state law 2 such
clauses would be effective under the Code.' s Under a full war-
ranty, however, there are limitations on the validity of clauses
that exclude incidental damages. A full warrantor is required to
remedy any defect "without charge." ' 4 Proposed regulations will
provide content to this concept. 5 Further, if the consumer suffers
incidental expenses because the warrantor fails to remedy the
defect promptly or imposes unreasonable duties oh the consumer,
the consumer may recover such expenses in litigation.'
The Magnuson-Moss Act allows both full and limited war-
ranties to contain clauses that exclude liability for consequential
damages.8 7 In a full warranty, the exclusion is ineffective unless
it appears conspicuously on the face of the warranty.'8 ' While the
Act does not contain a similar requirement for limited warranties,
179. E.g., United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403
(1956).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1976).
181. See text at note 306 infra.
182, 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1976).
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(1) (1976) provides for limitations on remedies to
repair or replace the product, thus, by implication allowing the warrantor to exclude
incidental damages. While id. § 36-2-719(3) provides that limitations on consequential
damages are not valid if unconscionable, the restriction does not apply to incidental
damages. No case has been found involving unconscionability of a clause limiting inciden-
tal damages.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1),(d) (1976).
185. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,223 (1977) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 705).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(d) (1976). The requirement that the remedy be provided with-
out charge does not generally require the warrantor to reimburse the consumer for
"incidental expenses." The meaning of this term is unclear, but the most reasonable
interpretation is that it refers to consequential damages as defined in the U.C.C. See note
41 supra.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1976) (full warranties). While the Act does not expressly
allow such a clause for limited warranties, it follows logically that limited warranties may
contain such an exclusion because full warranties may do so.
188. Id.
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the U.C.C. provides that a limited remedy is ineffective if it is
unconscionable." 9 Courts should declare that "hidden" limita-
tions on recovery of consequential damages are unconscionable.
Provisions excluding consequential damages are also subject to
restrictions imposed by state law."' Clauses limiting consequen-
tial economic damages are generally effective under the Code.' 9'
The major problem that arises in connection with clauses
that exclude incidental or consequential damage is not their
effectiveness in general but rather their validity if the warrantor
fails to comply with its obligations under the warranty. While
some courts have held that such limitations are effective even if
the warrantor fails to honor its warranty obligations, a better
approach is to consider the warranty and the restrictions as a
package. 2 2 In a sense the warranty represents a fair bargain be-
tween the consumer and the warrantor. The warrantor agrees to
promptly repair any defects while the consumer gives up claims
for consequential and incidental damages in return for prompt
repair. When the warrantor fails to act promptly, the bargain
collapses. The consumer should be entitled to recover those dam-
ages that he incurs because of the collapse of the agreement.
D. Buyers' Security Interests and Rights of Setoff
The U.C.C. provides buyers with two rights that are of great
practical significance in enforcing claims for breach of warranty.
A buyer who rightfully rejects or revokes acceptance has a secu-
rity interest in the goods for any amounts paid to the seller as well
as expenses incurred.'93 Further, a buyer may deduct damages for
breach of warranty against any amounts still owed on the con-
tract."14
These rights are of practical significance to the buyer in two
ways. The buyer need not tender goods to the seller in order to
reject or revoke acceptance. Possession by the buyer is a proper
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(3) (1976).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1976).
191. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(3) (1976) ("but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not" prima facie unreasonable); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d
480, 483 (Ky. App. 1978).
192. Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973); Murray v.
Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 430-33, 265 N.W.2d 513, 525-26 (1978) (citing
principal authorities).
193. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-711(3) (1976).
194. Id. § 36-2-717.
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way for him to enforce his security interest. 9 5 Second, these rights
provide the buyer with defenses in the event the seller or a financ-
ing entity brings suit against the buyer seeking possession of the
collateral. The buyer can argue that the plaintiff has no right to
the goods because its failure to pay on the contract was not a
default but a permissible deduction of damages. Further, the
buyer can argue that the plaintiff has no right to possession of the
goods because the buyer's security interest provides it with a
superior right. Discussion of defenses to claim and delivery ac-
tions are discussed below. '
E. Availability of Remedies for Breach of
Warranty Against Dealers and Financing Agencies
1. The Role of Dealers and Financing Entities. - The sys-
tem that distributes consumer goods involves numerous parties:
component-part suppliers, manufacturers, wholesalers, dealers,
and financing entities. 9 ' One of the major problems in connection
with remedies for breach of warranty is determining the party
against whom remedies may be asserted. Revocation of accep-
tance against manufacturers was discussed previously.'99 This
section focuses on the issue of whether remedies for breach of
warranty may be asserted against dealers and financing agencies.
To analyze this issue correctly, however, requires an understand-
ing of the role played by dealers and financing agencies in the sale
of consumer products.
New consumer products are normally marketed under writ-
ten consumer-product warranties issued by the manufacturer of
the goods. Typically, the goods are sold through retailers who
"pass through" the manufacturer's warranty, for example, when
a retailer sells a packaged product that contains the warranty.
Dealers may, but usually do not, make warranties of their own.
Consumer product warranties instruct the consumer what to do
in the event of breach. Some warranties provide for repair work
through authorized representatives of the manufacturer, while
others require the consumer to return the product to the manu-
facturer for repair. Such representatives are often, but not al-
195. Id. § 36-2-711(3) ("and may hold such goods").
196. See section I. E. infra.
197. See C. Rnrrz, supra note 106, at 115-38 (description of distribution system).
198. See text at note 164-66 supra.
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ways, the dealers from whom the goods were purchased. In the
event repair work is done by dealers, contracts between manufac-
turers and dealers provide for compensation to the dealers. Used
goods may or may not be sold under written warranty, but proba-
bly most are sold with an attempted disclaimer of all warranties
by the dealer.
Banks, credit unions, and other financing entities are in-
volved in financing the purchase of both new and used consumer
products. Financing of purchases of consumer products typically
takes one of three forms: assignment by seller, direct secured
loan, or unsecured credit-card purchase. In the assignment trans-
action the dealer retains a purchase-money security interest in
the goods and subsequently assigns the contract to a financing
entity. In the loan transaction the consumer negotiates a loan
directly with some financing entity. The financier pays the seller
and takes a purchase-money security interest in the goods. If the
dealer arranges for the financing with the lender, the second
transaction is functionally identical to the first. Finally, some
purchases take place through credit cards, such as Visa or Master
Charge, that have been issued by some lending institution.'99
2. Remedies Against Dealers. - If the dealer makes either
a written or implied warranty to the consumer and the warranty
is breached, the consumer has the right to assert remedies against
the dealer. The problem is determining when a dealer "makes" a
warranty to the consumer. Several situations should be distin-
guished. If the dealer gives the consumer its own written warranty
(as opposed to the manufacturer's warranty), it clearly "makes"
a warranty for the breach of which a consumer could pursue reme-
dies. More difficult is the situation in which the dealer simply
passes through the manufacturer's warranty and makes no state-
ment or provisions about its own warranty liability. In this situa-
tion thd consumer normally will have remedies for breach of war-
ranty against the dealer on either of two theories. The consumer
can argue that the dealer adopted the manufacturer's warranty
as its own.2 11 In the alternative the consumer can argue that the
199. For a description of the transactions see Federal Trade Commission, Statement
of Basis and Purpose for Rule on Preservation of Consumer Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed.
Reg. 53,560 (1975).
200. 16 C.F.R. § 700.4 (1979). In Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Co., 230 S.C. 131, 94
S.E.2d 397 (1956), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a dealer adopted the
manufacturer's warranty when it inserted in the contract of sale a clause that stated there
were no warranties other than those contained in the manufacturer's written warranty.
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dealer did not disclaim its implied warranty of merchantability
and that a claim should be allowed for breach of this warranty.20'
The most troublesome case is one in which the dealer passes
through the manufacturer's warranty and also expressly dis-
claims its own implied warranties. Whether the dealer should be
held liable for breach of the manufacturer's warranty should de-
pend on the dealer's actions. 212 If the dealer affirmatively assumes
obligations under the warranty by words or by conduct, such as
undertaking repair of the product, it should be held liable for
breach of the warranty. On the other hand, if the dealer simply
passes through a packaged product that contains a written war-
ranty, it should not be held liable. Several reasons support this
conclusion. First, if the dealer assumes obligations under the war-
ranty, the consumer naturally expects that the dealer is responsi-
ble. Further, the dealer can protect itself against financial loss
through its contract with the manufacturer. In addition, failure
to hold the dealer liable in such a situation will destroy the effec-
tiveness of the restrictions on the holder-in-due-course rules that
are discussed in the next section. Such consequences should not
be disregarded in interpreting the dealer's liability.
3. Remedies Against Financing Entities. - Historically,
financing entities have attempted to avoid liability for breach of
the contracts that they finance. Three devices - negotiable in-
struments, clauses that waive claims and defenses, and direct
loans - were used to insulate financiers from liability.2 3 By tak-
ing a negotiable promissory note from the seller, a creditor could
attempt to cut off the buyer's rights to assert claims and defen-
ses.20 4 A holder in due course takes a negotiable instrument free
of claims and defenses, If the seller had taken a consumer credit
contract from the buyer rather than a promissory note, the first
See also Richards v. Goerg Boat and Motors, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. App. 1979). Other
courts have reached opposite results. Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App.
94, 298 So. 2d 26 (1974), cert. denied, 292 Ala. 718, 298 So. 2d 34 (1974); Gilliam v. Indiana
Nat'l Bank, 337 So.2d 352 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); Bill McDavid Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Mul-
cahy, 533 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
201. If the dealer does nothing about its warranty liability, it will have made an
implied warranty of merchantability. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314 (1976). For breach of this
warranty the consumer would be able to seek remedies. Id. § 36-2-711, -714.
202. The courts are divided on this issue. See note 200 supra. See also 15 U.S.C. §
2310(0 (1976).
203. For a description of these devices see Federal Trade Commission, Statement of
Basis and Purpose, supra note 199.
204. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-305 (1976).
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method of cutting off claims and defenses would not succeed
because the assignee of the contract could not be a holder in due
course. This was because the contract was not a negotiable instru-
ment in that it contained promises and conditions which de-
stroyed its negotiability."5 To avoid liability in such transactions,
assignees relied on clauses by which the buyer agreed to waive its
right to assert claims and defenses against the assignee.08 Finally,
the financing entity could avoid liability by making a loan di-
rectly to the buyer rather than by taking an assignment of the
contract between buyer and seller. By preventing the lender from
becoming a party to the sales contract, this method eliminated
the contractual basis by which the consumer could assert claims
and defenses against the financier.
In 1975 the Federal Trade Commission promulgated a trade
regulation rule designed to eliminate these practices.0 ' The rule
divides transactions into consumer-credit sales and purchase-
money loans.0 ' Because credit card transactions are regulated by
the Truth-in-Lending Act,"' they are exempt from the applica-
tion of the rule. 210 The rule provides that, in a sale transaction, it
is an unfair or deceptive practice for a seller to take a consumer-
credit contract not containing a notice providing that any subse-
quent holder of the contract is subject to claims and defenses that
the consumer may have against the seller.21' The rule regulates
205. See id. § 36-3-104(1)(b).
206. Such clauses were generally valid. See id. § 36-9-206.
207. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1979). On September 21, 1979, the FTC voted to amend the
rule. The amendments do not affect the substance of the rule but rather extend the rule's
affirmative obligations to creditors as well as to sellers. Change in the wording of the notice
required by the rule is also contemplated. The Commission will promulgate a revised rule
in the near future. See 48 U.S.L.W. 2254 (1979).
208. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a),(b).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1976). The official title of the Act is the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act.
210. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c) (1979) (definition of creditor exempts credit card issuers).
See also Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 199, at
53,516. See text at notes 221-24 infra.
211. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1979). The notice is as follows:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS-
HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
The wording of this notice will be revised but its substance will remain the same. See note
207 supra.
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loan transactions by providing that it is an unfair or deceptive
practice for a seller to take the proceeds of a purchase-money loan
if the documents reflecting the loan do not contain a notice that
the lender is subject to claims and defenses that the buyer may
have against the seller.
212
The application of the rule to loan transactions, however, is
limited because the rule defines a purchase-money loan as one in
which the seller either regularly refers customers to the lender or
one in which the qeller and lender are affiliated. 213 The reason for
these restrictions is derived from the rationale for the rule. The
rule was designed to make creditors responsible for the sales prac-
tices of sellers but only when the relationship between the seller
and creditor was sufficiently regular to enable the creditor to shift
the economic consequences of misconduct back to the seller.2t 4
The rule allows the consumer to assert claims and defenses
that he has against the seller, either affirmatively or defensively,
against the holder of the contract.215 Thus, if the seller of a used
car effectively disclaims all warranties, the consumer has no
rights against the financing entity.215 Affirmative recovery against
the holder of the contract is limited to the amounts paid thereun-
212. Id. § 433.2(b). The notice is as follows:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUB-
JECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUN-
DER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY
THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
The wording of this notice will be revised but its substance will remain the same. See note
207 supra.
213. Id. § 433.1(d). The Commission has issued a Statement of Enforcement Policy
that provides guidance on when these requirements are met. 41 Fed. Reg. 43,594 (1976).
214. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 199, at
53, 524-25; Federal Trade Commission, Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning
Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022, 20,025 (1976).
215. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 199, at
53,524. One commentator has argued that the Magnuson-Moss Act insulates financers
from liability because it provides that claims for breach of warranty may be made only
against the person actually making the warranty. C. Rrrz, supra note 106, at 123. See
15 U.S.C. § 2310(f). There is no evidence in the legislative history that the Congress in-
tended such a result. Instead, the provision seems to have been aimed at protecting
intermediaries in the distribution system from liability. Further, such a large inroad
into the limitations on the holder-in-due-course doctrine should not be adopted unless
compelled by clear intent of Congress. Such is not the case here.
216. Federal Trade Commissioi, Guidelines, supra note 214, at 20,024.
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der. 1 7 This means that in a direct loan, the consumer could not
recover from the lender any amounts paid to the seller as a down-
payment, nor could the consumer recover from either an assignee
or a lender consequential damages or attorney's fees.28 Of course,
if the seller can be joined in such an action, the consumer can
obtain complete relief by asserting claims against both, but there
may be instances in which the seller is either out of business or
not subject to suit.
The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code also gives a
consumer the right to assert claims and defenses against assign-
ees or lenders. 29 These rights, however, are narrower than those
given by the FTC rule. In particular, the South Carolina provi-
sions effectively preclude affirmative recovery by limiting liabil-
ity to the amount owing on the contract at the time notice is
given. Thus, if the contract contains-the FTC notice, it, rather
than the Consumer Protection Code, will govern the liability of
the assignee or lender.220
The right of a consumer to assert claims and defenses against
the issuer of a credit card is governed by the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act (usually called the Truth-in-Lending
Act) 221 While South Carolina has a similar provision, I the fed-
eral act will always apply because it provides for the same mea-
sure of recovery and has less stringent notification requirements.
An issuer of credit cards is liable for claims and defenses if:
(1) the consumer has made a good faith effort to obtain satisfac-
tion from the seller; (2) the amount of the initial transaction
217. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1976) (notice provides that affirmative recovery is limited to
the amounts paid under the contract).
218. See Federal Trade Commission, Guidelines, supra note 214, at 20,023.
219. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-404 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (assignees), § 37-3-410 (Cum.
Supp. 1978) (lenders).
220. If the contract fails to include the FTC notice, the liability of an assignee or
lender is somewhat unclear. It could be argued that the operation of the FTC notice is
dependent on its inclusion in the contract. Thus, if the notice is not included a buyer could
assert rights against a financing entity only to the extent allowed under the South Carolina
Consumer Protection Code. See Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Enforcement
Policy, supra note 213; Note, The FTC's Holder-in-Due-Course Rule: An Ineffective
Means of Achieving Optimality in the Consumer Credit Market, 25 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 821,
854 (1978). On the other hand, it seems strange that a person can be relieved of liability
through an unfair or deceptive trade practice. Further, financing entities are clearly on
notice as to the existence of the FTC rule. It seems more sensible to construe the notice
as an implied term of contracts governed by the rule.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1976).
222. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-411 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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exceeds fifty dollars; and, (3) the place where the initial transac-
tion took place was in the same state as the consumer's mailing
address or was located within one-hundred miles of that address.
If the issuer of the card is affiliated with the seller, the second and
third limitations do not apply.2 3 The amount of recovery against
the issuer may not exceed the amount owing at the time the card
holder first notifies the issuer.1
24
F. Breach of Warranty as a Defense
in Claim and Delivery Actions
If a consumer purchases goods on credit and suffers a breach
of warranty, a natural thing for the consumer to do is to stop
paying the creditor. If the matter remains unresolved most credi-
tors will bring suit on the debt. If the creditor has a security
interest, it will also seek possession of the collateral. The proceed-
ing to obtain immediate possession of secured collateral in South
Carolina is the claim and delivery action.
2 5
The claim and delivery action requires four steps. First, the
plaintiff must file an affidavit which alleges: (1) that the plaintiff
is entitled to the property either because of ownership or special
property; (2) that the property is wrongfully detained by the de-
fendant; (3) the cause of the detention; (4) that the property has
not been seized subject to tax levy or attachment; and (5) the
actual value of the property.228 Attached to the affidavit must be
a notice of right to a preseizure hearing.22 The plaintiff must
deliver a sufficient bond to the sheriff.
2 28
Second, the sheriff must serve the affidavit and notice of
right to a preseizure hearing on the defendant.
2 1
The purpose of the preseizure hearing is to protect the de-
fendant's use and possession of property from arbitrary en-
croachment, and to prevent unfair or mistaken deprivations of
property. If the judge shall, after conducting the hearing, find
that the plaintiff's claim for immediate possession is probably
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(a) (1976).
224. Id. § 1666i(b).
225. Claim and delivery actions may be brought in either circuit or magistrate's
court. The following discussion assumes that the case is brought in circuit court. See S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-69-10 to -210 (1976); id. §§ 22-3-1310 to -1480 (1976).
226. Id. § 15-69-30.
227. Id. § 15-69-40.
228. Id. § 15-69-50.
229. Id.
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valid and the defendant has no overriding right to continue in
possession of the property, then the judge may allow the claim
for immediate possession and endorse the affidavit accord-
ingly.23
Third, if a preseizure hearing is not required or if the court deter-
mines that the plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession, the
court instructs the sheriff to obtain possession of the property.2'
Fourth, the defendant may retain possession of the property ei-
ther by defeating the plaintiff's right at the preseizure hearing or
by posting a bond in double the value of property. 
2
The statute is vague as to the defenses which may be raised
by a defendant to defeat a claim of immediate possession. Some
judges take the position that the only way that the defendant may
maintain possession is by posting bond. The rationale for this
view is that the plaintiff must post bond to obtain the property,
so if the defendant wants possession he must do the same. This
view is not supported by statute or policy. The statute clearly
provides that the defendant may retain possession either by post-
ing a bond or by showing that the plaintiff does not have a right
of immediate possession. 24 Further, one purpose of the statute is
to provide debtors a meaningful opportunity to contest the claims
of creditors.235 This interpretation of the statute deprives indigent
debtors of this right because indigents are unable to meet the
bonding requirement.
Assuming that courts will allow defendants to raise some
defenses at the claim and delivery hearing, two issues require
analysis. What types of claims may the defendant raise? How
should a judge decide who is entitled to immediate possession?
230. Id. § 15-69-70.
231. Id. § 15-69-80. The section contemplates that the defendant may have waived
the right to a preseizure hearing by a provision in the contract. Although the section
provides that the waiver must be made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly, it further
provides that the plaintiff may demonstrate this to the court by affidavit. The constitu-
tional validity of such a provision is questionable. See Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1972).
232. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-69-140 (1976).
233. Speech by Nathan M. Crystal, Judicial Continuing Legal Education Seminar
Sponsored by the South Carolina Bar Ass'n in Columbia, S.C. (Jan. 20, 1979) (statements
by judges in audience).
234. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-69-70, -140 (1976).
235. The prejudgment hearing provisions of the statute were enacted after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) that held judicial proce-
dures for taking a debtor's property without notice and hearing violated due process.
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Any defense that contests the validity of the plaintiffs secu-
rity interest should be assertable at the hearing. This is because
the plaintiff's right to immediate possession is dependent on the
plaintiff having a "special property." ' Similarly, the defendant
should be allowed to raise any defense to the validity of the debt
or default because the plaintiffs right to possession is dependent
on a showing of wrongful detention by the defendant. 23 If the
defendant is not in default, the detention is not wrongful.
Less clear is the issue of whether a counterclaim for damages
may be raised by the defendant to defeat a claim of immediate
possession. Under the U.C.C. and the Consumer Protection Code,
claims for damages for breach of warranty or Truth-in-Lending
violations may be used to reduce the amount of any debt owed.
28
Based on this doctrine of setoff, .the defendant should be allowed
to assert such counterclaims at the claim and delivery hearing.
The second question that judges must answer is who is enti-
tled to immediate possession when defenses or counterclaims are
raised. If a debtor raises a defense or counterclaim for damages
at a claim and delivery hearing, the judge should receive a proffer
from the defense concerning the grounds of the defense or coun-
terclaim. A formal evidentiary hearing should not be held, how-
ever, because the claim and delivery hearing is intended to be
preliminary and not to substitute for a full trial on the merits.
The judge should then make a determination concerning the
probable validity of the claims and defenses. Such a determina-
tion is for the purpose of the hearing only and should not be
binding if the matter goes to trial.
If the judge determines that a defense to the debt or security
interest is probably valid, the claim for immediate possession
should be denied because the plaintiff has no right to the goods
unless the detention is wrongful. If the judge determines that a
counterclaim is probably valid, he should compare the amount of
236. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-69-30(1) (1976). If the plaintiff cannot produce a written
security agreement its claim for immediate possession should be denied because it does
not have an enforceable security interest in the collateral. Id. § 36-9-203.
237. Id. § 15-69-30(2). For example, if the plaintiff failed to send the defendant a
notice of right to cure, as required by the Consumer Protection Code, the plaintiff should
be denied immediate possession because the plaintiff has no legal right to enforce its
security interest until 20 days after the notice has been sent. Id. § 37-5-111(1) (Cum. Supp.
1978).
238. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-717 (1976) (setoff of damages for breach of warranty); id.
§ 37-5-205 (setoff of damages for violation of Truth.in-Lending Act).
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the counterclaim with the amount owed the plaintiff. When the
counterclaim is large relative to the amount owed, immediate
possession should be denied because the defendant's equity
should constitute an overriding right to possession.4 9 For exam-
ple, if a bank is suing for repossession of a used vehicle and the
defendant has a probably valid claim to revoke acceptance for
breach of warranty, the court should deny the plaintiff immediate
possession. On the other hand, when the plaintiff's claim is large
relative to the counterclaim, immediate possession should be
granted. For example, suppose the plaintiff sues to repossess a
mobile home worth $20,000. Immediate possession should be
granted if the defendant raises a Truth-in-Lending counterclaim
for $1000.
G. Class Actions
40
1. Class Actions in Federal Court. - Prior to the passage
of the Magnuson-Moss Act, consumer class actions for breach of
warranty could not, as a practical matter, be brought in federal
court. Because federal law did not provide a cause of action for
breach of warranty, the jurisdiction for any such class action
must have been founded on diversity of citizenship. No action
based on diverse citizenship could be brought unless the amount
in controversy exceeded $10,000.2 11 In Snyder v. Harris,42 the
Supreme Court held that, in a class action under 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure founded on diversity of citizen-
ship, individual claims, each of which was less than $10,000,
could not be aggregated to reach the jurisdictional amount. Sub-
sequently, the Supreme Court held in Zahn v. International
Paper Co., ' 3 that a class action in which the claim of the named
plaintiffs exceeded $10,000 could not be brought on behalf of
239. Id. § 15-69-70.
240. This section is limited to a discussion of the question of whether a class action
for breach of warranty may be maintained legally. Even if such a class action is legally
proper, an attorney has delicate ethical questions that must be considered before deciding
to undertake such an action. Is a class action in the best interest of the client? Is the lawyer
competent to handle a class action? What are the attorney's ethical responsibilities to
class members in the event a class action is certified? How far may an attorney go in
attempting to obtain a sufficient number of named plaintiffs to meet the Magnuson-Moss
Act requirements? For a discussion of these questions, see Developments in the
Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1319 (1976).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
242. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
243. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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unnamed plaintiffs whose claims were less than that amount.
Because most consumer claims for breach of warranty, other than
claims for personal injury or property damage, do not approach
the jurisdictional amount, these decisions effectively precluded
the use of federal courts.
The Magnuson-Moss Act creates a cause of action for breach
of warranty that may be brought in either federal or state court
and provides that no action may be brought in federal court if (1)
the amount in controversy for any individual claim is less than
twenty-five dollars; (2) the amount in controversy for all claims
involved in the suit is less than $50,000; or (3)"the number of
named plaintiffs is less than 100. Because of these provisions,
Snyder will no longer prevent class actions in federal court for
products that cost more than twenty-five dollars, but there are
still significant hurdles to such actions. The requirement of 100
named plaintiffs will often be difficult to overcome. More trouble-
some, however, is the absence of any provision in the Act to deal
with the notice problem in class actions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) provides: "In any
class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort." In Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"' the Supreme Court held that the rule
barred any class action that dispensed with notice. Further, the
Court held that the district court was unauthorized in imposing
almost ninety percent of the notice costs in the case on the defen-
dant after a pretrial hearing at which the court determined that
the plaintiff had established a substantial likelihood of prevailing
on the merits. If notice is required and if the plaintiff must bear
the costs, consumer class actions are precluded as a practical
matter.
The legislative history of the Magnuson-Moss Act indicates
that Congress was concerned with the notice problem.245 While
the House report states that the notice requirement should not be
invoked to preclude class actions, the Act is silent on the ques-
tion, and in light of the lack of receptivity which the federal
courts have shown to consumer class actions, one cannot be san-
244. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
245. H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprinted in 11974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7724.
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guine about the prospects.
One commentator has argued that the requirements of Rule
23, including the notice requirement, do not generally apply to
class actions brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act."' There are
two difficulties with this approach. First, the Act and legislative
history are not clear on whether Congress intended to dispense
with these requirements. In the absence of a clear expression of
intent, one would assume that Magnuson-Moss class actions
would be treated like other class actions and be governed by the
rule. Second, notice to class members may be constitutionally
required.
2 1
2. Class Actions in State Court. - If a consumer class ac-
tion cannot be brought in federal court, a class action in state
court could be considered. It is arguable that the Magnuson-Moss
Act authorizes consumer class actions for breach of warranty in
state court even if such actions could not have been brought
previously; however, the better interpretation of the Act is that
the availability of a class action in state court will continue to be
determined by state law.24 The South Carolina Code provides:
"When the question is one of a common or general interest to
many persons or when the parties are very numerous and it may
be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole."'2"1 While the
246. C. RErrz, supra note 106, at 99-101.
247. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-74 (1974).
248. Arguably, the Magnuson-Moss Act authorizes class actions to be brought in
state court if they do not meet the jurisdictional requirements for class actions in federal
court. The legislative history may support this interpretation. The Senate bill provided
that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to change in any way the jurisdic-
tional or venue requirements of any State." S. 356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 110(b) (1974).
The Senate report states that the purpose of this language was
to preserve the status quo as to the eligibility under State law for participation
in class actions. . . .Because Federal rights would be enforced in State courts,
some might argue that limitations that certain States impose on participation
in class action litigation, would not be valid. The above mentioned language
preserves such limitations ....
S. Rep. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973). Because the version of the Act that was
passed did not contain this language, one could argue that the deletion was intended to
authorize class actions in state court. This is supported by general statements in the
legislative history of the House bill, which in large measure became the enacted version,
that the remedy provisions were designed to give consumers greater protection and should
be construed liberally.
On the other hand, the conference report did not mention the language; the omission
may have resulted from a general adoption of the House bill rather than an intentional
design to reverse the provisions of the Senate bill.
249. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-50 (1976).
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language of the section seems broad enough to authorize a con-
sumer class action for breach of warranty, the South Carolina
courts probably would not entertain such an action. 50
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has followed the
"community of interest" theory of class actions.25' Under this
theory a class action cannot be brought unless the plaintiffs are
united in their legal right. The existence of common legal or fac-
tual questions is not sufficient. For example, shareholders of a
corporation may bring a derivative action as a class against direc-
tors because each member of the class is united in a single right
that the corporation has against the directors. 52 Similarly, an
action for an injunction against the enforceability of a statute on
the ground that the statute is unconstitutional may be main-
tained as a class action. 213 Likewise, if the class asserts a single
right against a common fund, a class action may be main-
tained.25
4
Courts in other jurisdictions have extended the class action
to consumer claims on the theory that common questions of law
or fact establish a sufficient community of interest.55 Indeed, this
is the approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 15 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, has uniformly re-
jected attempts to extend class actions to such cases.25?
250. See Note, State Class Actions, 27 S.C.L. lEv. 87, 91-115, 170-73 (1975).
251. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1329-72 (1976).
252. Hernlen v. Vandiver, 145 S.C. 412, 437, 143 S.E. 222, 230 (1928); Black v.
Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913). Because of criticism of the theory, other states
have passed statutes that authorize class actions despite the absence of a community of
interest. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 901-09 (Consol.
1976); WXis. STAT. ANN. § 426.110 (West 1974).
253. Evans v. Creech, 187 S.C. 371, 197 S.E. 365 (1938) (class action by voters barred
by res judicata effect of prior action brought by other voters).
254. Powell v. Gary, 200 S.C. 154, 20 S.E.2d 391 (1942) (fund of insurance company
in hands of receiver).
255. Hoover v. May Dep't Stores Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762 (1978).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
257. In Earle v. Webb, 182 S.C. 174, 188 S.E. 798 (1936), mortgagors of a building
and loan association attempted to bring a petition to intervene as a class in a liquidation
proceeding. They alleged that they and other members of the class had overpaid interest
to the association. The court gave many reasons for its decision, including cost and expen-
ses of going through the records of the association to determine whether such claimants
existed, but ultimately the decision rested on the court's view that each claimant had a
separate legal right. Quoting from Bannister v. Bull, 16 S.C. 220 (1881), the court held
[tihey may be said, in one sense, to have a common interest, but, according to
our decided cases, they are not as against a stranger, united in interest in the
sense of this section of the Code. They have interests in the same property while
[Vol. 31
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IV. DEFENSES TO WARRANTY ACTIONS
A. Written Warranties
1. Right to Cure. - The Magnuson-Moss Act provides that
no cause of action may be brought under the Act until the warran-
tor is given a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects.2 s Since
most breach of warranty cases will be brought under the Act
because of the availability of recovery of attorney's fees,25 this
standard of cure rather than the cure provisions of the U.C.C.
25
will normally govern. The major question that a court will face
in applying this provision is determining whether a buyer has the
right to demand a replacement product or refund of the purchase
price rather than being required to submit the product for repair.
Under the U.C.C., courts have distinguished between major and
minor defects. If the defect was minor, for example an adjustment
of picture quality on a television set, the warrantor had the right
to cure. However, if the defect was major, for example a defective
transmission, the buyer was entitled to a new product or refund
on the theory that the buyer's confidence in the product had been
shaken.8 1
it remains undivided, but such interests are distinct. Each has a right to the
extent of his share.
Id. at 186 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Wilder v. South Carolina State Highway
Dep't, 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E.2d 635 (1955), an automobile owner brought a class action
against the highway department seeking recovery of postage charges that he alleged were
not authorized by statute. The court held that plaintiff could not maintain the action
individually. It went on to say that it had "no hesitancy" in holding that the action could
not have been maintained as a class action. Id. at 457, 90 S.E.2d at 639. There was not a
common legal right but rather numerous legal claims. The recent case of Benjamin v.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 269 S.C. 250, 237 S.E.2d 72 (1977), follows this approach.
There the supreme court affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer to a class action brought
to recover vested benefits under a pension plan that had been declared invalid. The court
stated that each member had a separate legal claim for his portion of the fund.
In Trowell v. Blue Cross, Civ. Action No. 69-4078, Order Approving Settlement, (Ct.
C. Pleas Richland County, S.C., December 21, 1978), a class action in the Court of
Common Pleas of Richland County, plaintiff claimed that defendant had retained monies
that it was required to pay under the terms of its policies when part of the medical
expenses had been paid by Medicare. Trowell seems to be a significant expansion of the
common-fund theory because the subscribers had separate legal rights to amounts under
their policies. However, the case has been settled, so no ruling on the validity of the class
action will be forthcoming from the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
258. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1976).
259. Id. § 2310(d)(2).
260. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-508 (1976).
261. Compare Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. App. 1967) with Asciolla v.
Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977).
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The distinction between major and minor defects should not
be adopted by courts in applying the Magnuson-Moss Act. First,
as a matter of statutory construction, the Act impliedly rejects
the claim that a buyer has a right to a new product when the
defect is major. Even a warrantor who elects to make a full war-
ranty is only required to replace the product or refund the pur-
chase price if it cannot make the repair after a reasonable number
of attempts. 6 ' Second, the result is not justified as a matter of
policy because it increases the costs associated with honoring
warranties. Consumers will naturally want a replacement prod-
uct rather than repair. This will generate disputes between war-
rantors and consumers. A line of cases distinguishing major from
minor defects will develop. Litigation expenses will necessarily
increase. A better approach is to allow the warrantor an oppor-
tunity to cure all defects, no matter how major. If the warrantor
cannot do so after a reasonable number of attempts, the buyer
should be able to exercise whatever legal rights he has.
2. Lack of Privity. - The problem of lack of privity arises
when a consumer or some other person affected by a consumer
product brings a lawsuit against the warrantor when there is no
contractual relationship between the parties. Vertical privity re-
fers to the relationship between plaintiff and the parties in the
chain of distribution other than the retail seller. 63 Horizontal
privity refers to the relationship between the plaintiff and the
retail seller. In South Carolina, lack of privity, whether horizontal
or vertical, is not a defense to an action for breach of warranty
by a consumer regardless of whether the action is under the
Magnuson-Moss Act or the U.C.C. South Carolina's version of
the U.C.C. abolishes lack of horizontal privity as a defense to
actions brought by consumers.264 A recent supreme court case
held that the statute abolished the defense of lack of vertical
privity as well."6 5 If the action is brought under the Magnuson-
Moss Act, a court would be bound to follow these rules.
2 6
3. Failure to Provide Notice of Breach. - The U.C.C. re-
262. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1976).
263. J. Wro'E & R. SUMMERS, supra note 91, at 327.
264. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976) provides: "A seller's warranty whether express
or implied extends to any natural person who may be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and whose person or property is damaged by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
265. Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1976).
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quires a buyer who discovers a defect to notify the seller or be
barred from any remedy under the Code."' Formal notice require-
ments should not be imposed. Courts should hold that the notice
requirement is complied with if the buyer reasonably informs the
seller he has experienced a defect and demands relief.L26
8
4. Statute of Limitations. - The South Carolina version of
the Code provides that actions for breach of contract of sale,
including breach of warranty, must be brought within six years
after the cause of action accrues. 269 The principal problem that is
likely to occur with this provision is its effect on clauses that limit
the duration of implied warranties, an issue that was discussed
above.2 0
B. Other Warranties
Many of the same defenses that can be raised in an action
for breach of a written warranty also apply to an action for breach
of warranties that arise only under the U.C.C. However, there is
one defense that applies to warranties under the U.C.C. but not
to written warranties, the defense of disclaimer of warranties. 7'
1. Disclaimers of Express Warranties. - Dealers who wish
to disclaim all warranty liability are often concerned about liabil-
ity for oral representations made by salesmen, for example, a
statement that a used automobile was a one-owner vehicle. To
avoid this liability dealers often include clauses in the sales con-
tract (usually called "merger clauses") that state that the con-
tract constitutes the entire agreement of the parties and there are
no representations or warranties other than those contained in the
document. 2 To what extent is the seller bound by oral represen-
tations made by salesmen, despite the existence of the merger
clause? Two factual situations should be distinguished.
If the oral representations are rescinded prior to the signing
of the contract, the seller is not bound by them because they do
not constitute part of the basis of the bargain. 3 For example, if
267. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (1976).
268. See text at notes 159-61 supra.
269. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725 (1976).
270. See text at notes 125-32 supra.
271. If a warrantor makes a written warranty, any disclaimer of implied warranties
is ineffective. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1976).
272. See J. WHiTE & R. SUMMEas, supra note 91, at 356 (1972) (example of merger
clause).
273. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313(1) (1976). See also id. § 36-1-201(3) (" 'Agreement'
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the salesman informed his manager of the representation before
the contract was signed, the manager could instruct the salesman
to tell the customer that the salesman was mistaken in his asser-
tion that it was a one-owner vehicle.
2 74
The more difficult situation is one in which the seller relies
solely on the merger clause to deny liability for statements made
by salesmen. Courts should not deny the buyer the right to pres-
ent evidence of oral statements simply because of the existence
of such a clause.0Instead, courts should examine the negotiations
leading to the execution of the contract. If the court finds that the
contract was intended by both parties to be a final statement of
their rights and duties, evidence of oral statements should not be
received. Absent this finding, the court should admit the evi-
dence." 5 In consumer settings such an intent is much less likely
than in commercial settings.
2. Disclaimers of Implied Warranties. - The implied war-
ranty of merchantability may be disclaimed or excluded in three
ways. First, the warranty may be disclaimed by language which:
(1) includes the word merchantability; (2) is specific; and (3) in
the case of a written disclaimer, is conspicuous.27 The South
Carolina version varies from the uniform version of the Code in
that it requires disclaimers to be specific.277 The meaning of this
means the bargain of the parties in fact . . ").
274. R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 214 (1970).
275. Compare Mobile Housing, Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
(contract not intended as final expression of intent) with Jordan v. Doonan Truck &
Equipment, Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d 881 (1976) (contract as final expression of intent).
See also R. NORDSTROM, supra note 274, at 215. This approach is clearly contemplated by
the uniform version of the U.C.C. Section 2-316(1) provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1962 version). Section 2-202 bars the admission of parol evidence if the
written agreement is intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement.
Although South Carolina has a nonuniform version of § 2-316(1), the same approach
should be followed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(1) states: "If the agreement creates an
express warranty words disclaiming it are inoperative." Analysis of the "agreement" of
the parties would require a court to determine if the written agreement was intended to
be a final expression of the agreement of the parties. This is exactly the approach contem-
plated by uniform § 2-202. Further, a federal district court in South Carolina adopted this
approach in a commercial case. Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974).
276. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (1976).
277. The uniform version of § 2-316(2),(3) provides:
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requirement is obscure. One interpretation is that it requires the
seller to inform the buyer of the provision.118 Another interpreta-
tion is that the use of the word "merchantability" is not suffi-
cient. The disclaimer must contain more specific language that
explains the effect of the disclaimer.
Courts should adopt the second interpretation for several
reasons. The South Carolina reporter's comments to the U.C.C.
seem to support this view.29 Further, the second interpretation
expresses a sound policy. It is likely that many buyers do not
understand the significance of the terms "merchantability" and
"fitness for a particular purpose." The requirement of further
explanation fosters the policy of avoiding surprise to the buyer.
In addition, this interpretation of the specificity requirement is
consistent with the proposed Federal Trade Commission Rule on
used motor vehicles, which requires explanation concerning the
impact of the disclaimer on the buyer. 20
The first method of disclaiming warranties requires that the
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description
on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is, .... with all faults" or other lan-
guage which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied war-
ranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
278. This interpretation finds some support in pre-Code case law. E.g., Durant v.
Palmetto Chevrolet Co., 241 S.C. 508, 129 S.E.2d 323 (1963) (restriction in written war-
ranty separated from sales contract ineffective unless specifically brought to buyer's atten-
tion).
279. The reporter discusses the conflicting policies of bringing disclaimers to the
attention of buyers and contractual certainty. The first interpretation advances the former
at the expense of the latter, while the second seems to be a balance of these policies. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316 (1976) (S.C. Reporter's Comments, 5th paragraph).
280. See 41 Fed. Reg. 1089 (1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 455).
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disclaimer be conspicuous as well as specific. The Code defines
conspicuous as follows:
A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE
BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form
is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or
color. But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous."
Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for decision
by the court.28'
The section is unclear. Does it mean that all clauses are to be
judged by the reasonable-person standard set forth in the first
sentence, with the examples merely showing facts which tend to
make a clause conspicuous? Or, do the second and third sen-
tences provide "safe havens" of conspicuousness that override the
first sentence? For example, envision a written contract with the
signature line on the front page which states at the bottom that
it is subject to the terms and conditions on the reverse side. On
the reverse side, a provision in large type disclaims all warranties.
Is the disclaimer conspicuous?
Most courts seem to apply the reasonable person standard.
2
Further, the reasonable person test is supported by the official
comment, which states: "This is intended to indicate some of the
methods of making a term attention-calling. But the test is
whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to
it.,,283
A second method of disclaiming implied warranties is by
specific language that in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
there is no implied warranty.284 Under the uniform version of the
Code, language such as "as is" or "with all defects" is sufficient
to disclaim all implied warranties, but the sufficiency of this
language in South Carolina is uncertain. The drafters of the
South Carolina version deleted the language from the uniform
version that specifically sanctioned the use of such.disclaimers. 25
281. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(10) (1976).
282. E.g., Houck v. DeBonis, 38 Md. App. 85, 98-99, 379 A.2d 765, 772-73 (1977);
Williams v. College Dodge, Inc., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 958 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1972).
283. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201 (1976) (Official Comment 10).
284. Id. § 36-2-316(3)(a) (1976).
285. See note 277 supra for the uniform version.
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Surely the change was not made to economize language. It might
be argued that it defies common sense to hold that an "as is"
disclaimer is ineffective because the term is widely used and un-
derstood. However, many people may think that "as is" makes
them responsible for obvious defects, such as appearance, but not
for latent defects. The FTC's proposed rule on used motor vehi-
cles, discussed in the next section, requires an explanation in
addition to the use of "as is." Because of these reasons, South
Carolina courts should conclude that an "as is" disclaimer is not
sufficient to disclaim implied warranties in South Carolina, but
that additional explanatory language is necessary. The language
contained in the proposed FTC rule should be sufficient.286
A third method by which warranties may be excluded is by
examination. If the buyer fully examines the goods, there are no
implied warranties as to defects that ought to have been discov-
ered by an examination.
2
1
7
3. Warranties on Used Motor Vehicles. - The Magnuson-
Moss Act requires the Federal Trade Commission to initiate a
rule-making proceeding dealing with warranty practices in the
used motor vehicle sales industry. 28 The Commission has issued
for comment a proposed rule which requires dealers to reveal
certain information by means of a disclosure statement that must
be attached to the right rear window of any used motor vehicle
that is offered for sale. In addition, under the proposed rule, if a
used motor vehicle is offered for sale without a warranty and the
seller attempts to disclaim any implied warranty, the contract
must contain the following language:
AS IS
THIS USED MOTOR VEHICLE IS SOLD AS IS WITHOUT
ANY WARRANTY, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED.
THE PURCHASER WILL BEAR THE ENTIRE EXPENSE OF
REPAIRING OR CORRECTING ANY DEFECTS THAT
PRESENTLY EXIST OR THAT MAY OCCUR IN THE
VEHICLE.
21
If the proposed rule is adopted, failure to make either of these
disclosures, or the making of any oral or written statement that
286. For the text of the proposed rule see 41 Fed. Reg. 1089 (1976).
287. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(3)(b) (1976).
288. 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (1976).
289. 41 Fed. Reg. 1089, 1090 (1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 455).
1980]
53
Crystal: Consumer Product Warranty Litigation in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tends to detract from or mitigate them, will constitute an unfair
or deceptive act or practice under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act."' If a person engages in an unfair or deceptive
practice, the Federal Trade Commission has a variety of remedial
options including suing for consumer redress 9' and recovery of
civil penalties.92 A consumer in South Carolina would also have
a private cause of action for recovery of actual damages against
a dealer who violated the rule. If the violation is willful, treble
damages may be recovered.9 3
V. OTHER THEORIES OF LIABILrY
Breach of warranty is the basic theory of liability that would
be relied on by a consumer to recover economic loss. A lawyer
should consider other theories that could be asserted in connec-
tion with a breach of warranty theory or that may provide alter-
native theories if warranty theory is unavailable, for example,
when the seller effectively disclaims all warranties in the sale of
a used vehicle.
A. Strict Liability in Tort
In 1974 the South Carolina legislature enacted section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is often referred to
as "strict liability in tort."" 4 A tactical reason for attempting to
use a strict-liability theory to recover economic loss is that dis-
claimers of liability are legally ineffective to bar recovery based
on such a theory. 5 This tactical advantage may be more appar-
ent than real. As discussed above, clauses that attempt to dis-
claim or limit liability for breach of warranty are often invalid
290. Id.
291. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1) (1976).
292. Id. § 45(m)(1)(A).
293. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140 (1976).
294. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).
295. The statute provides that the comments to section 402A of the RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TorS are incorporated by reference and constitute the legislative intent of
the chapter. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (1976). The comments to the Restatement provide
that the "consumer's cause of action ...is not affected by any disclaimer or other
agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and
accompanying the product into the consumer's hands." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS
§ 402A, Comment m (1965). E.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska
1976) (rejecting recovery of economic loss under strict-liability theory because inconsistent
with right to disclaim liability granted by U.C.C.).
346 [Vol. 31
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because improperly drafted. 98 Further, attorney's fees are not
recoverable in a strict-liability action.29 The following discussion,
however, assumes that bringing an action for recovery of eco-
nomic loss under a strict-liability theory makes tactical sense.
Whether strict liability theory may be used to recover dam-
ages for economic loss has divided the courts of other jurisdic-
tions.9 8 The issue is unsettled in South Carolina. While a federal
district court held that such damages were not recoverable under
a strict-liability theory,99 a recent supreme court case casts doubt
on the issue.10
Recovery of economic loss under a strict-liability theory
should not be allowed in South Carolina because recovery of such
damages is inconsistent with the legislative intent embodied in
the strict-liability statute and is not wise as a matter of public
policy."' South Carolina is one of te few states in which liability
296. See text at notes 274-287 supra.
297. But see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (1976).
298. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 285 n.10 (Alaska 1976)
(collecting cases and concluding that majority view rejects liability). If property damages
rather than economic damages are suffered recovery under strict liability is allowed. Cloud
v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977) (upholding claim under strict-liability theory
to recover damage to mobile home resulting from fire; Morrow distinguished). While the
distinction between economic loss and property damage is fuzzy, "sudden and calamitous
damage will almost always result in direct property damage," while "deterioration, inter-
nal breakage and depreciation will be considered economic loss." Id. at 251.
299. Cooley v. Salopian Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114, 1118-19 (D.S.C. 1974).
300. In Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978) the su-
preme court held that "property" under § 2-318 of the U.C.C. included lost profit, a form
of economic loss. Because the strict-liability statute makes a seller liable for damages to
property, the court might construe that statute as allowing recovery of economic loss. On
the other hand, the strict-liability statute deals with "unreasonably dangerous" products
and speaks in terms of "physical harm."
301. The two reasons usually given to support the conclusion that recovery of dam-
ages for economic loss should not be allowed under strict liability seem unconvincing.
First, strict liability developed to protect consumers against severe personal injury
and property damage losses; when the loss is economic the reasons for imposing strict
liability are not as compelling. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145,
151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965). But, for many consumers economic loss can be disastrous.
The purchase of a car or mobile home is one of the most significant investments that a
consumer may make during his life. A distinction based on the assertion that such a claim
is not compelling does not seem sound.
Second, imposing strict liability is inconsistent with the provisions of the U.C.C. that
allow a seller to disclaim warranties. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548 P.2d 279, 285-86
(Alaska 1976). The Code provides, however, that disclaimers are prima facie unconsciona-
ble when personal injuries are suffered. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-719(3) (1976). Allowing
recovery for economic loss in strict liability is tantamount to extending the unconsciona-
bility doctrine to this type of damage. Although the effect of this is that disclaimers are
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was adopted by legislation rather than by court decision. As a
result, courts here are bound by the legislative intent in enacting
that statute. The legislature has expressed the intent that the
statute is to be interpreted in accordance with the comments to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2 These com-
ments clearly indicate that the purpose of section 402A was to
provide recovery for physical damage to person or property rather
than for economic loss. 33 Moreover, as a matter of public policy,
allowing recovery of economic loss would be undesirable. Eco-
nomic analysis tends to show that the benefits to consumers from
such a rule are outweighed by the costs.
3 °4
ineffective in all consumer cases, this does not render the provisions of the U.C.C. super-
fluous. Such clauses would still be valid in commercial transactions.
302. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (1976).
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comments cd (1965).
304. One of the major developments in legal theory in the last fifteen years has been
the application of economic theory to a wide variety of legal problems, including judicial
decisionmaking. R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYsIs OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). Economic analysis
concludes that judges should render decisions that promote social efficiency. Id. at 10. In
general, efficiency is achieved if contractual provisions are enforced by courts. Id. at 10-
12. Courts should interfere with contractual provisions only when there is some evidence
that market transactions are not working to maximize consumer welfare. The prime
examples of such market failure are fraud and monopoly. Id. at 399-404 (concept of market
failure); id. at 87 (fraud); id. at 201-05 (monopoly).
While many consumers might not understand the terms of their warranties, this
misunderstanding is probably attributable more to their unwillingness to make the invest-
ment of time necessary to decipher the warranty than to fraud by the manufacturer.
Further, the disclosure requirements of the Magnuson-Moss Act make an even weaker
case that the typical written warranty is fraudulent.
Although many industries are highly concentrated, this alone is not evidence that
manufacturers are exercising monopoly power. An industry might be highly concentrated
because efficiency dictates that firms reach a certain size. Id. at 251-52. Even an industry
with few members might be highly competitive depending on whether the members acted
in concert or not.
While written warranties tend to be uniform, this is probably explained more by the
fact that the typical written warranty is an efficient method of minimizing the mix of cost
involved in dealing with product defects than on the basis of the exercise of monopoly
power.
A manufacturer that is adopting a warranty policy must evaluate repair and investi-
gation costs. Repair costs could, of course, be eliminated by not giving any warranty. But
consumers demand some warranty protection and are willing to pay for it. On the other
hand, it would be undesirable for a manufacturer to establish an unlimited return policy.
This would not give consumers any incentive to maintain their products and would leave
manufacturers with used goods, which are often difficult to dispose of. Investigation costs
are involved because, with complex products, it is often difficult to determine whether
damage occurs because of product defect, consumer fault, or accident, such as road haz-
ard. Manufacturers face costs in determining the cause of a product failure. They also face
the possible cost of loss of consumer good will if they are strict in denying warranty claims.
The typical manufacturer's limited warranty has three parts: (1) a narrowly drawn
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B. Common-Law Fraud
The cause of action for fraud has nine elements: (1) a repre-
sentation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge
by defendant of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity; (5) intent that the representation be acted on; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its
truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the hearer's
consequent and proximate injury."'
It is important for an attorney to understand the scope of
common-law fraud in South Carolina as well as the related con-
cept, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. Some
examples should help. Suppose a purchaser buys a car after the
dealer represents that it has been reconditioned. In fact, repair
work was not done and the dealer.knew it. The purchaser has a
cause of action for common-law fraud. Suppose on the other hand
that a purchaser buys a used car and the dealer gives a thirty-
day warranty. A problem develops within the warranty period but
the dealer refuses to honor the warranty. The buyer has a cause
of action for breach of contract but not for fraud; punitive dam-
ages may not be recovered. If the dealer received the car and
claimed to honor the warranty when in fact not doing so, the
express warranty, which defines the parts warranted and establishes a standard with
which the parts must comply; (2) a limitation of the duration of implied warranties to
the duration of the express warranty or some other reasonable period; and (3) a clause
that modifies the buyer's remedies in the event of breach, generally by limiting the buyer's
rights to repair or replacement of the product, and that excludes liability for consequential
damages. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act upon Consumer Product Warranties,
55 N.C.L. REv. 835, 841 (1977). Under such a warranty, so long as the consumer complies
with the terms of the warranty, such as maintenance requirements, the manufacturer is
obligated to repair any product defect that occurs within the warranty period. Thus, the
warranty seems to be an efficient response to the cost situation that the manufacturer
faces. It responds to the consumer's demand for warranty protection yet limits and defines
the manufacturer's obligation, thus reducing investigation and repair costs.
Exactly what manufacturers would do in response to imposition of strict liability for
defective products that cause only loss of bargain is uncertain. If the limited warranty is
truly an efficient solution, one would expect manufacturers to adopt it as a working policy
for dealing with consumer complaints of defectiveness. For example, a company might
decree in its policy manuals that it would repair any product that was returned with a
defect within 12 months or 12,000 miles but not after that period. Even if manufacturers
did this, efficiency might not result. Consumers would have a greater incentive to litigate
because of strict liability. This litigation would increase warranty costs. Manufacturers
would have to respond with increased prices or, perhaps, some change in their warranty
policy.
305. O'Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., 262 S.C. 276, 281, 204
S.E.2d 50, 52 (1974). See Woodward v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 240 S.E.2d 641 (1978) (proxi-
mate injury not established merely by showing vehicle not a one-owner car as represented
by seller).
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buyer would have a cause of action for actual and jiunitive dam-
ages based on the theory of breach of contract accompanied by a
fraudulent act."'6
Common-law fraud offers two advantages over other theories
of liability. First, punitive damages may be recovered. Second,
liability may be based on the failure to disclose information; the
South Carolina Supreme Court has held that a vendor has a duty
to disclose material information accessible to the seller when the
seller knows that such information is not readily available to the
buyer.0 ' However, there may be problems with a fraud theory.
Whether the proof must be clear and convincing or by a prepon-
derance of the evidence is unclear."0 A mere breach of contract,
for example, a failure to honor a warranty, is not actionable under
a fraud theory. 00 Further, one cannot be heard to complain of
fraud when the buyer could have discovered the truth by exercise
of reasonable prudence, for example, by reading the contract be-
tween the parties." '
C. Liability for Violation of the Federal Odometer Law
The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act 31' pro-
hibits tampering and other deceptive practices in connection with
odometers"1 and requires transferors of motor vehicles to make
certain disclosures at the time of sale.31 3 Any person who violates
any provision of the Act with intent to defraud is liable for treble
actual damages or $1500, whichever is greater, plus costs and
attorney's fees 4.31 The action may be brought in any federal dis-
trict court without regard to amount in controversy or in any state
court of competent jurisdiction within two years of the date when
liability arises.1
306. Dunsil v. E.M. Jones Chevrolet Co., 268 S.C. 291, 233 S.E.2d 101 (1977) (dissent-
ing opinion of Chief Justice Lewis discusses issues).
307. Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972).
308. See Gilbert v. Mid-South Mach. Co., 267 S.C. 211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976) (clear
and convincing evidence required but may be satisfied by preponderance of evidence).
309. Woodward v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 240 S.E.2d 641 (1978), Morrison v. Chrysler
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 107 (D.S.C. 1967) (breach of warranty not actionable under fraud
theory).
310. Woodward v. Todd, 270 S.C. 82, 240 S.E.2d 641 (1978).
311. 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
312. Id. 99 1983 to 1987.
313. Id. § 1988.
314. Id. § 1989(a). See Kirkland v. Cooper, 438 F. Supp. 808 (D.S.C. 1977).
315. Id. § 1989(b). Liability arises when the violation is discovered. Levine v. Mac-
Neil, 428 F. Supp. 675 (D. Mass. 1977).
[Vol. 31"-
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To recover under the Act the plaintiff must establish viola-
tion of a requirement of the Act with intent to defraud.316 A mere
violation of the Act without some evidence of intent to defraud
is not sufficient to establish liability. Thus, dealers are not liable
merely for failing to provide an accurate disclosure statement '17
or for failing to discover tampering with an odometer."8 If a viola-
tion is coupled with some evidence of fraud, however, a prima
facie case of liability is established. For example, a dealer who
gave a disclosure statement that stated that the odometer reading
was accurate violated the act when the dealer should have known
that the reading was incorrect.
319
Because privity of contract is not necessary to maintain an
action under the Act, a purchaser may bring suit against any
transferor in the chain of title through which the car reached
her.2 0 Courts are divided on the question of whether transferors
are severally liable or jointly and severally liable for the statutory
penalty.32 ' Courts should construe the Act to hold transferors sev-
erally liable. Prior to Congress' amendment of the remedy provi-
sions of the Act in 1976, a district court held transferors severally
liable.22 The failure to overrule this decision is some evidence
that Congress tacitly approved of it. Further, because used cars
often pass through hands of numerous transferors, joint liability
would seriously weaken the regulatory purpose of the Act.
While the Act is unclear on whether liability extends to
agents and employees of transferors, courts should decide that it
does. 3 3 The language of the statute supports this conclusion. Al-
316. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1976).
317. Mayes v. Warren Hollen Motors, 410 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Shepherd
v. Eagle Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 536 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
318. Pepp v. Superior Pontiac GMC, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. La. 1976).
319. Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1978); Delay v. Hearn Ford, 373 F. Supp.
791 (D.S.C. 1974).
320. Mataya v. Behm Motors, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 65, 68 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
321. Compare Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.W. Va. 1975) (sever-
ally liable) with Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Neb. 1977), aff'd,
578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978).
322. Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.W. Va. 1975).
323. On this issue compare Stier v. Park Pontiac, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.W. Va.
1975) (liability imposed on employee) with Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
1381 (D. Neb. 1977), affl'd, 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978) (president of transferor not liable)
and Romans v. Swets Motors, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (corporate manager
not liable) and Coulboume v. Rollins Auto Leasing Corp., 392 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Del. 1975)
(sales agent not liable).
1980]
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though the disclosure provisions only apply to transferors, 34 the
remedy section extends to "any person. 3 25 Further, imposing lia-
bility on an employee who tampers with an odometer or sells a
car knowing that the odometer reading is incorrect is not unfair.
Employees are only liable if they act with intent to defraud.
D. Liability Under the South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act
Under South Carolina law "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful. ' ' 328 The Act provides that any person who suffers an
"ascertainable loss of money or property" as a result of such act
or practice may recover actual damages, plus attorney's fees. If
the violation is willful, treble actual damages are allowed.32 Be-
cause of the provisions for recovery of attorney's fees and treble
damages, the Act offers obvious advantages over other theories of
warranty liability.
In applying this Act courts will face two major issues. What
warranty practices constitute unfair or deceptive conduct? When
has a consumer suffered "actual damages" within the meaning of
the Act? In construing the Act, South Carolina courts are to be
guided by the interpretations that the federal courts and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission have given to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.32 These decisions should provide some standards for
determining when a warranty practice is "unfair or deceptive."
A mere breach of warranty should not violate the Act because
such a breach can occur without fault under circumstances that
do not involve unfairness or deception. However, repeated failure
to honor a warranty or a pattern or practice of selling shoddy
goods should violate the Act.2
Establishment of actual damages may be difficult. For ex-
ample, if a warrantor fails to comply with the disclosure require-
ments of the Magnuson-Moss Act, it engages in an unfair or de-
ceptive practice.3 Yet, it may be difficult for a consumer to show
324. 15 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
325. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1976).
326. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (1976). See also id. § 56-15-30 (Deceptive Trade
Practices Act for motor vehicles).
327. Id. § 39-5-140(a). See also id. § 56-15-110 (Unfair Trade Practices Act for motor
vehicles providing for recovery of double actual damages).
328. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (1976).
329. Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 24 U.C.C. REP. SRV. 1057, 1066 (Ky. App. 1978).
330. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (1976).
[Vol. 31
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that actual damage flows from this conduct. Because the Unfair
Trade Practices Act was intended as a consumer protection mea-
sure, it should be liberally construed. Any tangible harm that
flows from a practice should be compensated. Thus, a consumer
should be able to recover for annoyance or inconvenience as well
as for out of the pocket expenses.
31
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act has substantially
increased the complexity of warranty law. Two new types of war-
ranties, full and limited warranties, have been created. The Act
imposes various substantive and disclosure obligations on war-
rantors. Further, it creates a new cause of action for breach of
written and implied warranties. Despite the increase in complex-
ity, the Act offers the prospect of improvement in the warranty
system through increased information and more available reme-
dies for consumers. It is unlikely, however, that the Act repre-
sents the culmination of consumer demand for warranty reform.
Instead, it probably represents a step in an evolving process of
reform of the warranty system in this country. Even now, Con-
gress is considering amendments to the Magnuson-Moss Act.3 2
331. Cf. Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976) (action
for actual damages under Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)).
332. H.R. 1005, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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APPENDIX A
NOTICE OF REJEcrIoN/REvoCATION
Dear _ :
I am an attorney representing On - Mrs.
purchased a new 1979 automobile from you. Shortly
after the purchase, Mrs. . encountered several mechanical problems,
including (details).
She returned the vehicle to you for repair on three occasions. (Include details).
Each time she was assured that the vehicle had been repaired. Each time the
same problems reappeared within a few days.
This letter is to inform you that Mrs. hereby exercises her
legal right to cancel the contract. (S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-711(1)). Please
inform me how Mrs. may obtain a refund of her purchase price and
cancellation of the security agreement and note that she signed. Until we hear
from you, Mrs. - is exercising her legal right to retain possession of
the vehicle as security for the debt (S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-711(3)).
Please direct all communication regarding this matter to me rather than
my client. I look forward to hearing from you in the near future.
Sincerely,
NOTE: Appropriately worded letters should also be sent to the manufacturer
and financing entities involved in the transaction.
354 [Vol. 31
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